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Abstract
Mean-field games with absorption is a class of games, that have been introduced in
Campi and Fischer [7] and that can be viewed as natural limits of symmetric stochastic
differential games with a large number of players who, interacting through a mean-field,
leave the game as soon as their private states hit some given boundary.
In this paper, we push the study of such games further, extending their scope along
two main directions. First, a direct dependence on past absorptions has been introduced
in the drift of players’ state dynamics. Second, the boundedness of coefficients and costs
has been considerably relaxed including drift and costs with linear growth. Therefore,
the mean-field interaction among the players takes place in two ways: via the empirical
sub-probability measure of the surviving players and through a process representing the
fraction of past absorptions over time. Moreover, relaxing the boundedness of the coeffi-
cients allows for more realistic dynamics for players’ private states. We prove existence
of solutions of the mean-field game in strict as well as relaxed feedback form. Finally,
we show that such solutions induce approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player game
with vanishing error in the mean-field limit as N →∞.
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1 Introduction
Mean-field games (MFGs for short) are, loosely speaking, limits of symmetric stochastic
differential games with a large number of players, where each one of them interacts with the
average behaviour of his/her competitors. They were introduced in the seminal papers by
Lasry and Lions [42, 43, 44] and, simultaneously, by Huang et al. [33]. An increasing stream
of research has been flourishing since then, producing theoretical results as well as a wide
range of applications in many fields such as economics, finance, crowd dynamics and social
sciences in general. For an excellent presentation of the theory we refer to the lecture notes
by Cardaliaguet [8] and the two-volume monograph by Carmona and Delarue [9].
Motivation. In most of the literature on MFGs, all players stay in the game until the end
of the period, while in many applications, especially in economics and finance, it is natural
to have a mechanism deciding when some player has to leave. Such a mechanism can be
modelled by introducing an absorbing boundary for the state space as in Campi and Fischer
[7], which is the starting of our study (other related references will be discussed later in
detail). Therein, existence of solutions of the MFG and of approximate Nash equilibria for
the N -player games were provided under some boundedness assumptions on the coefficients
and without including the effect of past absorption on the survivors behaviour. The present
paper continues the investigation of this kind of games, with two main extensions:
(i) We introduce a direct dependence on past absorptions in the drift of the Stochastic
Differential Equations (SDEs) describing the evolution of the players’ states, so that
the proportion of the absorbed players have an effect on the future time evolution of the
survivors. This feature was not present in Campi and Fischer [7], where the empirical
measure of the survivors was re-normalized at each time. Such a dependence on past
absorption is also included in the costs.
(ii) We allow both the drift and the cost functional of the players to have linear growth,
hence they are not necessarily bounded unlike in Campi and Fischer [7]. Moreover, the
set of absorbing states O can be unbounded. Dropping the boundedness of the game
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data increases the flexibility of our setting, which can include more realistic dynamics
from the viewpoint of applications (for more details, see later in this introduction).
To be more precise, the purpose of this paper is to study N -player games and related
MFGs in the presence of an absorbing set (i.e. a player is eliminated from the game once
his/her private state process leaves a given open set O ∈ Rd), and where the vector of private
states XN = (XN,1, . . . ,XN,N ) is assumed to evolve according to:
X
N,i
t = X
N,i
0 +
∫ t
0
(
uN,i
(
s,XN
)
+ b¯
(
s,XN,is , L
N
s ,
∫
Rd
w(y)µNs (dy)
))
ds
+ σWN,it , t ∈ [0, T ] , i ∈ {1, . . . , N} , (1.1)
where uN = (uN,1, . . . , uN,N ) is a vector of feedback strategies, WN,1, . . . ,WN,N are inde-
pendent d-dimensional Wiener processes defined on some filtered probability space, σ is some
(non-degenerate) diffusion matrix, and b¯, w are given deterministic functions. Additionally,
µNt is the (random) empirical sub-probability measure on R
d representing the (empirical) den-
sity of survivors at time t ∈ [0, T ], and LNt is a counting process representing the fraction of
players who left O by time t ∈ [0, T ]:
µNt (·)
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ
XN,it
(·) 1
[0,τX
N,i
)
(t) and LNt
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
[τX
N,i
,∞)
(t) ,
where τX
N,i .
= inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : XN,it 6∈ O} is the time of first exit of X
N,i from O, with
the convention inf ∅ = ∞. Each player evaluates a strategy vector uN = (uN,1, . . . , uN,N )
according to his/her expected costs over a random time horizon:
JN,i
(
u
N
) .
= E
[∫ τN,i
0
f¯
(
s,XN,is , L
N
s ,
∫
Rd
w(y)µNs (dy), u
N,i(s,XN )
)
ds
+F
(
τN,i,X
N,i
τN,i
)]
. (1.2)
In Eq.(1.2), XN is the N -player dynamics under uN and τN,i
.
= τX
N,i
∧ T . In the present
work, we are interested in drifts b¯ and cost functional f¯ with sub-linear growth, hence possibly
unbounded. Further details on the setting with all the technical assumptions will be given
in Section 2.
As we have anticipated before, the dynamics above is (also) motivated by economic models
for corporate finance, systemic risk, and asset allocation. For instance, we can interpret
players as firms whose values are represented by the state variables XN,i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Each company is affected by the fraction of both defaulted and non-defaulted firms through
the processes LN and µN respectively, and takes strategic decisions accordingly. Moreover,
sub-linearity of the drift allows to include a mean-reversion term representing the trend to
follow the crowd. A possible application is the pricing of portfolio credit derivatives where the
pricing depends upon the so called distance-to-default of the assets in the portfolio (Hambly
and Ledger [29]). Alternatively, each player can be interpreted as a bank, whose monetary
reserve evolves according to the stochastic dynamics in Eq.(1.1) where the drift depends
on both the rate of interbank borrowing/lending and on a controlled borrowing/lending to
a central bank, as in Carmona et al. [10]. However, in Carmona et al. [10] no absorbing
boundary conditions and no dependence on the loss process are considered. The latter features
could be incorporated in the model by introducing absorbing boundary conditions at the
default level, similarly to Hambly and Ledger [29]. This would enable to study the impact of
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defaults on systemic risk and stability of the financial system described by the game. Last
but not least, the proposed set-up allows for a Brownian motion with an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
type drift modelling for the private state, a model that has been used (for instance) for the
notion of flocking to default in the financial literature (Fouque and Sun [23]). However, in
the present paper we focus on the mathematical properties of the proposed family of games
and we leave the applications for future research.
Main results. The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce the MFG with smooth dependence on past absorptions, i.e. the limit
model corresponding to the above N -player games as N tends to infinity. For a solution
of the MFG, the empirical densities of survivors µNt are replaced by a flow of sub-
probability measures. See Definition 2.2.
• We prove existence of a relaxed feedback solution of the MFG with smooth dependence
on past absorptions and, under an additional assumption, we show that the optimal
feedback strategies are in strict form; see Theorem 3.1, Proposition 3.5 and Proposition
3.6. Additionally, we show that there exist relaxed and strict feedback solutions that
are Markovian up to the exit time; see Lemma 3.8.
• We show that if we have a feedback solution of the MFG (either relaxed or strict) we
can construct a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding N -player
games with a vanishing approximation error as N →∞; see Theorem 4.1 and Corollary
4.1.
The proof of the existence of feedback solutions of the MFG is inspired by the work of Lacker
[38] in the sense that we proceed by approximation. We construct a sequence of approximating
MFGs with bounded drift and cost functional to which we can apply the results of Campi
and Fischer [7]. Then, we prove convergence of the solutions of these approximating MFGs
to a solution of the original one. Nonetheless, the procedure in Lacker [38] cannot be applied
directly to our case mainly due to the history dependence and the discontinuities of the
coefficients induced by past absorptions. In particular, a different instance of the mimicking
result of Brunick and Shreve [6] applies to our case.
The proof of the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player game is based
on weak convergence arguments and controlled martingale problems. The use of martingale
problems in proving convergence to the McKean-Vlasov limit and propagation of chaos for
weakly interacting systems goes back to Funaki [24], Oelschlager [51] and Méléard [48]. We
observe that, whereas standard results prove convergence in law of the empirical measures, in
the present paper we follow the approach of Lacker [40] to obtain a strong form of propagation
of chaos with possibly unbounded and path-dependent drift. We show that the empirical
measures converge in a stronger topology (the τ -topology), a result that enables us to take
the limit as N → ∞ even if strategies are (only) progressively measurable functionals of
the state trajectories. In particular, in our framework continuity of the MFG solution with
respect to the state variable is no longer feasible due to the possibly unboundedness of the
coefficients, whereas the proof of Campi and Fischer [7] relies strongly on this property.
Related literature. We have already discussed the paper of Campi and Fischer [7], so here
we focus on some other recent contributions in the literature of mean-field models and games
related to ours. First, we cite the works of Giesecke et al. [26] and Giesecke et al. [27] where
a point process model of correlated defaults timing in a portfolio of firms is introduced. A
mean-reverting jump-diffusion dynamics that depends on the default rate in the pool describes
the intensity with which a firm defaults. Every time one firm defaults a jump occurs in the
default rate of the pool and hence in the intensities of the survivors. Giesecke et al. [26] prove
a LLN for the default rate as the number N of firms goes to infinity.
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Motivated by modelling the contagion effect are the works of Hambly and Ledger [29],
Hambly et al. [30] and Hambly and Sojmark [31] too. In the first work the authors prove
a LLN for the empirical measure of a system of finitely many (uncontrolled) diffusions on
the half-line, absorbed when they hit zero and correlated through the proportion of the
processes that have been absorbed. In Hambly et al. [30] extended their model by including
a positive feedback mechanism when the particles hit the barrier, thus modelling contagious
blow-ups. A mathematical complement to the previous work is provided in Ledger and
Sojmark [45]. More recently, Hambly and Sojmark [31] have proposed a general model for
systemic (or macroscopic) events. By working on a set-up similar to Hambly and Ledger
[29], they interpret the diffusions as distances-to-default of financial institutions and model
the correlation effect through a common source of noise and a form of mean-reversion in the
drift. A form of endogenous contagion mechanism is also considered.
On the side of applications to economics, Chan and Sircar [13] and Chan and Sircar [14]
study oligopolistic models with exhaustible resources formulated as MFGs with absorption at
zero. In their model they keep track of the fraction of active players at each time. However,
this fraction appears in the objective functions but not in the state variable.
Two more papers are those by Delarue et al. [16, 17], where a particle system approach
is used to study the mathematical properties of an integrate-and-fire model from neurology.
The particles’ dynamics have some resetting mechanism which activates as soon as some
particle hits a given threshold.
We conclude this review with the two very recent papers by Nadtochiy and Shkolnikov
[49, 50]. The first one focuses on the cascade effect in a new interbank mean-field model with
defaults and a contagion effect modelled via a singular interaction through hitting times. The
second one investigates the associated mean-field game also including more general dynamics
and connection structures.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce the notation and present both the N -player
and the mean-field dynamics along with the main assumptions. Section 3 contains results on
the existence of feedback solutions of the MFG. In Section 4 we construct approximate Nash
equilibria for the N -player game from solutions of the limit problem. The technical results
used in the paper can be found in the Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries and assumptions
In the present section, we provide the definitions of the different spaces of trajectories and
measures used in the paper along with the corresponding topologies, distances and notions
of convergence. We describe the setting of N -player games with smooth dependence on past
absorptions and the corresponding MFG by stating the main assumptions. In particular, we
give the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game and that of solution of the
MFG. We conclude the section by extending the notion of control to that of relaxed control
and adapt the definitions of Nash equilibrium and MFG solution accordingly.
Spaces of trajectories. Let d ∈ N. We denote by O ⊂ Rd an open subset of Rd representing
the space of the players’ private states and by X
.
= C([0, T ];Rd) the space of Rd-valued
continuous trajectories on the time interval [0, T ], T < ∞. The space Rd is equipped with
the standard Euclidean norm, always indicated by | · |, while X with the sup-norm, denoted
by ‖ · ‖∞, which makes X separable and complete. We use the notation ‖ · ‖∞,t whenever
the sup-norm is computed over the time interval [0, t], t < T . Besides, we denote with
XN
.
= C([0, T ];Rd×N ) the space of N -dimensional vectors of continuous trajectories and
identify it with X×N .
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Spaces of measures. We use flows of probability and sub-probability measures to describe the
density of players and its time evolution in O. For E a Polish space, let Mf (E) denote the
space of finite Borel measures on E, P(E) the space of Borel probability measures on E and
M≤1(E) the space of Borel sub-probability measures on E, i.e. measures µ ∈ Mf (E) such
that µ(E) ≤ 1. These spaces are endowed with the weak convergence of measures (Billingsley
[5]). We define by ΥTP(E) (resp. by Υ
T
≤1(E)) the spaces of measurable flows of probability
(resp. sub-probability) measures on E, i.e. the space of Borel measurable maps π (resp. µ)
from the time interval [0, T ] to P(E) (resp. M≤1(E)). Wherever possible without confusion,
we use ΥTP (resp. Υ
T
≤1) when E = R
d. We denote by P1(E) and by M≤1,1(E) the following
subsets of P(E) and M≤1(E):
P1 (E)
.
=
{
π ∈ P (E) :
∫
E
dE(x, x0)π(dx) <∞ for some x0 ∈ E
}
,
M≤1,1 (E)
.
=
{
µ ∈M≤1 (E) :
∫
E
dE(x, x0)µ(dx) <∞ for some x0 ∈ E
}
.
We endow P1(E) with the 1-Wasserstein distance W1:
W1(µ, ν)
.
= inf
π∈Π(µ,ν)
∫
E×E
dE (x, y) dπ(x, y) = sup
f∈Lip1(E;R)
∫
E
f(x)d(µ − ν)(x), (2.1)
where Π(µ, ν) ⊂ P1(E × E) represents the set of probability measures with given marginals
µ and ν, and Lip1(E;R) the set of Lipschitz functions on E with unitary Lipschitz con-
stant. The second equality in Eq.(2.1) is due to the Kantorovich-Rubinstein Theorem (see,
for instance, Theorem 6.1.1 in Ambrosio et al. [2]). Notice that (P1(E),W1) is a separable
and complete metric space whenever (E, dE) is separable and complete. Finally, let Υ
T
P,1(E)
(resp. ΥT≤1,1(E)) denote the space of measurable flows of probability measures in P1(E)
(resp. in M≤1,1(E)). Again, wherever possible without confusion, we use Υ
T
P,1 and Υ
T
≤1,1
when E = Rd.
Now, let O ⊂ Rd be a non-empty open set, the set of non-absorbing states and let Γ ⊂ Rd
the set of control actions. Consider w : Rd → Rd0 , d0 ∈ N, and
b¯ : [0, T ]× Rd × Rd0 → Rd, σ ∈ Rd×d,
f¯ : [0, T ]× Rd × Rd0 × Γ→ [0,∞), F : [0, T ]×Rd → [0,∞)
as in Eq.(1.1) and (1.2). We make the following assumptions:
(H1) w is continuous and with sub-linear growth, i.e. |w(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|) for all x ∈ Rd and
for some constant C > 0.
(H2) b¯, the drift, is jointly continuous and satisfies the following uniform Lipschitz continuity:
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣b¯ (t, x, l,m) − b¯ (t, x′, l′,m′)∣∣ ≤ L (∣∣x− x′∣∣+ ∣∣l − l′∣∣+ ∣∣m−m′∣∣)
for all (x, l,m), (x′, l′,m′) ∈ Rd × [0, 1] × Rd0 . Moreover it has sub-linear growth, i.e.∣∣b¯ (t, x, l,m)∣∣ ≤ C (1 + |x|+ |m|) ∀(t, x, l,m) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × [0, 1] × Rd0 .
(H3) f¯ , the running cost, and F , the terminal cost, are jointly continuous with sub-linear
growth: ∣∣f¯(t, x, l,m, u)∣∣ ≤ C (1 + |x|+ |m|)
|F (t, x)| ≤ C (1 + |x|)
for all (t, x, l,m, u) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × [0, 1] × Rd0 × Γ.
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(H4) The set O is open, convex and strictly included in Rd with C2-boundary, i.e. ∂O is the
graph of a C2 function. Alternatively, O = (0,∞)×d is also allowed.
(H5) The set Γ ⊂ Rd is compact and convex.
(H6) ν ∈ P(Rd), the initial distribution, satisfies
∫
Rd
eλ|x|
2
ν(dx) <∞ for some λ > 0.
(H7) σ ∈ Rd×d, the diffusion matrix, is positive definite (full rank).
The N -player dynamics. Let N ∈ N be the number of players. We assume that the players’
private states evolve according to the following system of N d-dimensional SDEs: for t ∈
[0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
X
N,i
t = X
N,i
0 +
∫ t
0
(
uN,i
(
s,XN
)
+ b¯
(
s,XN,is , L
N
s ,m
N
s
))
ds+ σWN,it , (2.2)
where XN,i0
d
∼ ν, WN
.
= (WN,1, . . . ,WN,N ) is an N -dimensional vector of independent d-
dimensional Wiener processes and XN
.
= (XN,1, . . . ,XN,N ) denotes the vector of all players’
private states. Moreover, the mean-field interaction terms LN and mN , called respectively
loss process and empirical average process, are defined as:
LNt
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
[τX
N,i
,∞)
(t) and mNt
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
w
(
X
N,i
t
)
1
[0,τX
N,i
)
(t) ,
for t ∈ [0, T ], with τX
N,i .
= inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : XN,it 6∈ O} the first exit time of X
N,i from the set
O. We can introduce the random empirical sub-probability measure µNt , defined as:
µNt (·)
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ
XN,it
(·) 1
[0,τX
N,i
)
(t) , t ∈ [0, T ],
so that, for future use, the empirical average process can also be expressed as
mNs
.
=
∫
Rd
w(y)µNs (dy).
Solutions of the previous SDEs are intended in the weak sense on some filtered probability
space (ΩN ,FN , (FNt )t∈[0,T ],P
N ) satisfying the usual conditions (see Remark 2.1 below).
In this game, the players implement feedback strategies uN = (uN,1, . . . , uN,N ) belonging
to UNN , the set of all vectors u
N , whose entries uN,i, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, belong to UN1 , the set
of all progressively measurable functions u : [0, T ] × XN → Γ. Player i evaluates a strategy
vector uN ∈ UNN according to his/her expected costs over a random time horizon:
JN,i
(
u
N
) .
= E
[∫ τN,i
0
f¯
(
s,XN,is , L
N
s ,m
N
s , u
N,i(s,XN )
)
ds + F
(
τN,i,X
N,i
τN,i
)]
, (2.3)
where XN is the N -player dynamics under uN and τN,i
.
= τX
N,i
∧ T . Our aim is the
construction of approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player game from a solution of the
limit problem. In the next definition, we use the standard notation [uN,−i, v] to indicate a
strategy vector equal to uN for all players but i-th, who deviates by playing v ∈ UN1 instead.
Definition 2.1 (ǫ-Nash equilibrium). Let ǫ ≥ 0. A strategy profile uN ∈ UNN is named
ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for any deviation
v ∈ UN1 we have:
JN,i(uN ) ≤ JN,i
([
uN,−i, v
])
+ ǫ.
A strategy profile uN ∈ UNN is a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if it is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium with ǫ = 0.
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The mean-field dynamics. Let µ ∈ ΥT≤1,1 be a flow of sub-probability measures. Given
a feedback strategy u and a flow of measures µ ∈ ΥT≤1,1, the representative player’s state
evolves according to the following equation:
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
(
u (s,X) + b¯ (s,Xs, L (s;µ) ,m (s;µ))
)
ds+ σWt, t ∈ [0, T ] , (2.4)
where X is a d-dimensional stochastic process starting at X0
d
∼ ν ∈ P(Rd) and W is a d-
dimensional Wiener process on some filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P). Again,
solutions of (2.4) are intended in the weak sense (see Remark 2.1).
Moreover, L : [0, T ] ×M≤1(X ) → [0, 1] and m : [0, T ] ×M≤1(X ) → R
d0 denote the
following deterministic functions:
L (t; θ)
.
= 1−
∫
X
1[0,τ(ϕ))(t)θ(dϕ),
m (t; θ)
.
=
∫
X
w (ϕ(t)) 1[0,τ(ϕ))(t)θ(dϕ),
for all (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ]×X and where τ(ϕ)
.
= inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : ϕ(t) 6∈ O}, ϕ ∈ X . Let Ufb denote
the set of all feedback strategies:
Ufb
.
= {u : [0, T ]× X → Γ : u is progressively measurable} .
The cost associated with a strategy u ∈ Ufb, a flow of measure µ, and an initial distribution
ν ∈ P(Rd) with support in O is given by (we omit, for the sake of simplicity, the explicit
dependence of Jµ(u) from ν):
Jµ (u)
.
= E
[∫ τ
0
f¯ (s,Xs, L (s;µ) ,m (s;µ) , u (s,X)) ds+ F (τ,Xτ )
]
(2.5)
where (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,W,X) is a solution of (2.4) under u with initial distribution ν, and
τ
.
= τX ∧ T the random time horizon. We define
V µ
.
= inf
u∈Ufb
Jµ(u),
and we make the following additional assumption on the initial conditionsXN,i0 , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and X0 :
(H8) The initial conditions XN,i0 , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and X0 have distribution ν ∈ P(R
d).
Remark 2.1. Both existence and uniqueness in law of weak solutions of Eq.s (2.2) and (2.4)
are guaranteed by Lemma A.1, and by Proposition 5.3.6, Remark 5.3.8 and Proposition 5.3.10
in Karatzas and Shreve [36] (see our Lemma A.2). Precisely, they can be proved by means
of Girsanov’s theorem and Beněs’ condition [4].
The notion of solution we consider for the MFG is the following:
Definition 2.2 (Feedback MFG solution). A feedback solution of the MFG is a triplet (ν, u, µ)
such that:
(i) ν ∈ P(Rd) with supp(ν) ⊂ O, u ∈ Ufb and µ ∈ Υ
T
≤1,1.
(ii) Strategy u is optimal for µ, i.e. V µ = Jµ(u).
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(iii) Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,X,W ) is a weak solution of Eq.(2.4) with flow of sub-probability
measures µ, strategy u and initial condition ν. Then
µt(·) = P({Xt ∈ ·} ∩ {τ
X > t}), t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 2.2 (Feedback and open-loop controls). Feedback controls induce stochastic open-
loop controls, i.e. tuples (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,X, u,W ) that are weak solutions of:
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
(
us + b¯ (s,Xs, L (s;µ) ,m (s;µ))
)
ds+ σWt t ∈ [0, T ] ,
where u is a progressively measurable Γ-valued stochastic process. As a consequence, the
computation of the infimum of Jµ(·) over the class of stochastic open-loop controls would
imply a lower value for V µ. However, thanks to Proposition 2.6 in El Karoui et al. [20], the
two minimization problems are equivalent from the point of view of the value function.
The canonical space. We will often work on the canonical filtered probability space, denoted
by (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) and defined on X as follows. Set Ω
.
= X , let ξ be an Rd-valued
random variable with law ν ∈ P(Rd) and let W be a d-dimensional Wiener process on X
independent of ξ. Define Wν ∈ P(X ) as the law of ξ + σW . Set F as the Wν -completion of
the Borel σ-algebra B(X ) and (F)t∈[0,T ] as the W
ν -augmentation of the filtration generated
by the canonical process Xˆ on X , i.e. Xˆ(ϕ)
.
= ϕ(t) for all (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ] × X . In particular,
(F)t∈[0,T ] satisfies the usual conditions. Finally set P
.
= Wν and W
.
= σ−1(ξ − Xˆ), which is
a Wiener process on X . Where no confusion is possible, we will drop the hat for simplicity
and write X in place of Xˆ.
Relaxed controls. In what follows we use relaxed controls (see El Karoui et al. [20] for a
precise definition), which allow us to view progressively measurable controls with values on
a compact set Γ as elements of the space of probability measures on Γ. The latter space is
compact and endowed with the weak convergence of measures. We introduce the space V of
relaxed controls:
V
.
= {q ∈ Mf ([0, T ] × Γ) : q(dt, dγ) = dtqt(dγ), t 7→ qt ∈ P(Γ)Borel measurable} ,
i.e. the space of finite positive measures on [0, T ] × Γ with Lebesgue time marginal. With a
slight abuse of notation, we denote with Λˆ both the identity map and the canonical process
on V (where no confusion is possible, we drop the hat and write Λ in place of Λˆ). Precisely,
a single-player relaxed control is a V-valued random variable Λ such that (Λt)t∈[0,T ] is a
progressively measurable P(Γ)-valued stochastic process. We say that Λ is a feedback control
if there exists a progressively measurable functional λ : [0, T ] × X → P(X ) such that Λt
.
=
λ(t,X) for all t ∈ [0, T ], with X denoting the player’s dynamics. Moreover, we say that Λ is a
strict and feedback control if there exists u ∈ Ufb such that λ(t,X)
.
= δu(t,X) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
We rewrite the dynamics and the cost functional for both the N -player game ((2.2) and
(2.3)) and the MFG ((2.4)) and (2.5)) by using the notion of relaxed controls. To this
end, for all (t, ϕ, θ, u) ∈ [0, T ] × X × P(X ) × Γ we define a more general drift function
b : [0, T ]×X ×M≤1(X )×Γ→ R
d and running cost function f : [0, T ]×X ×M≤1(X )×Γ→
[0,+∞):
b (t, ϕ, θ, u)
.
= u+ b¯ (t, ϕ(t), L(t; θ),m(t; θ)) , (2.6)
f (s, ϕ, θ, u)
.
= f¯ (t, ϕ(t), L(t; θ),m(t; θ), u) .
Moreover, we define as U˜NN and U˜
N
1 the sets of relaxed feedback N -player and single-player
strategies for the N -player game. We call U˜fb the set of relaxed feedback controls for the
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MFG. With this notation, the relaxed N -player dynamics and costs are defined by:
X
N,i
t = X
N,i
0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b
(
s,XN,i, µN , u
)
λN,i
(
s,XN,i
)
(du)ds + σWN,it , (2.7)
JN,i
(
λ
N
)
= E
[∫
[0,τN,i]×Γ
f
(
s,XN,i, µN , u
)
λN,i
(
s,XN,i
)
(du)ds + F
(
τN,i,X
N,i
τN,i
)]
,
t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, λN ∈ U˜NN and λ
N,i ∈ U˜N1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The MFG reads
as:
Xt = X0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b (s,X, µ, u) λ (s,X) (du)ds + σWt, (2.8)
Jµ (λ) = E
[∫
[0,τ ]×Γ
f (s,X, µ, u)λ (s,X) (du)ds + F (τ,Xτ )
]
where t ∈ [0, T ] and λ ∈ U˜fb.
In accordance, we give the notion of ǫ-Nash equilibrium and feedback solution of the MFG
by using relaxed controls.
Definition 2.3 (Relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile λN ∈ U˜NN is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium for the N -player game if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for any single-player
strategy β ∈ U˜N1
JN,i(λN ) ≤ JN,i
([
λ
N,−i, β
])
+ ǫ.
A strategy profile λN ∈ U˜NN is a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if it is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium with ǫ = 0.
Definition 2.4 (Relaxed feedback MFG solution). A relaxed feedback solution of the MFG
is a triplet (ν, λ, µ) such that:
(i) ν ∈ P(Rd) with supp(ν) ⊂ O, λ ∈ U˜fb and µ ∈ Υ
T
≤1,1.
(ii) λ is optimal, i.e. V µ = Jµ(λ).
(iii) Let (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],Q,X,W ) be a weak solution of Eq.(2.8) with flow of sub-probability
measures µ, control λ and initial condition ν. Then
µt(·) = Q({Xt ∈ ·} ∩ {τ
X > t}), t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 2.3 (Feedback and open-loop relaxed controls). Feedback relaxed controls induce
relaxed stochastic open-loop controls, i.e. tuples (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],Q,X,Λ,W ) that are weak
solutions of:
Xt = X0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b (s,X, µ, u) Λs(du)ds + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ]
where Λ is a progressively measurable P(Γ)-valued stochastic process. A similar argument
as in Remark 2.2 holds in this case as well.
The extended canonical probability space. When dealing with relaxed controls we work on an
extended version of the canonical probability space to X ×V. Set Ω˜
.
= X ×V, let F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ]
be the canonical σ-algebra and filtration on X whereas let G, (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be the Borel σ-algebra
and the filtration generated by the canonical process Λˆ on V. Set F˜t
.
= Ft⊗Gt for all t ∈ [0, T ]
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and F˜
.
= F ⊗ G.
Laws of processes with sub-linear drift. As said, in this paper we deal with Brownian-driven
stochastic processes with sub-linear drift (H2). Their laws belong to P(X ) or, more precisely,
to a subset Qν,K,C that we define in the following way. Qν,K,C ⊂ P(X ) is the space of all
laws θ ∈ P(X ) of continuous stochastic processes X defined on some filtered probability space
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) with Wiener process W and with the following dynamics:
Xt = ξ +
∫ t
0
us + v (s,X) ds+ σWt t ∈ [0, T ],
where ξ
d
∼ ν, u is a progressively measurable process bounded by some constant K > 0,
v : [0, T ]×X → Rd is a progressively measurable functional such that |v(t, ϕ)| ≤ C(1+ |ϕ(t)|)
for some constant C > 0 and for all (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ] × X . Notice that laws of processes of the
form
Xt = ξ +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
(u+ v (s,X))Λs(du)ds + σWt t ∈ [0, T ],
with ξ and v as above belong to Qν,|Γ|,C ⊂ P(X ) where |Γ| denotes the diameter of Γ.
3 Existence of solutions of the mean-field game
Throughout this section hypotheses (H1)-(H8) are in force. Under these and some additional
assumptions we show that both a relaxed and a strict feedback solution of the MFG exist; see
Theorem 3.1, Proposition 3.5 and Proposition 3.6. In addition, we guarantee the existence
of a feedback solution of the MFG with Markovian feedback strategy up to the exit time; see
Lemma 3.8.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of relaxed and strict feedback MFG solutions). Under assumptions
(H1)-(H8) and (C1), there exists a relaxed feedback solution (ν, λ, µ) of the MFG. Moreover,
under the additional assumption (C2), there exists a strict feedback solution (ν, u, µ) of the
MFG.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we proceed by approximation in the sense that – in the spirit of Lacker
[38] – we construct a sequence of approximating MFGs with bounded drift and cost functional
for which the existence of a solution is guaranteed by an extension of the results in Campi
and Fischer [7]; see Subsection 3.1. Then, we prove convergence of the solutions of these
approximating MFGs to a solution of the original MFG by interpreting the approximating
solutions as relaxed controls; see Subsection 3.2 (see El Karoui et al. [20] for details on relaxed
controls).
Before proceeding, we have to ensure the well-posedness of the game, i.e. we have to
ensure that the private state X of the representative agent remains in O up to time T with
some positive probability. This is the content of the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8). Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,X,W ) be a weak solu-
tion of Eq.(2.4). Then P(τX > t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Set bt
.
= u(t,X) + b¯(t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ)) for t ∈ [0, T ], and define Z
.
= (Zt)t∈[0,T ] as:
Zt
.
= Et
(
−
∫ ·
0
σ−1bsdWs
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
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By Lemma A.1, Z is a true martingale. Define Q by dQdP
.
= ZT . By Girsanov’s theorem
W˜t
.
=Wt+
∫ t
0 σ
−1bsds, t ∈ [0, T ], is a Q-Wiener process, and under Q the process X has law
Wν . As a consequence of the law of iterated logarithms, any Wiener process remains in an
open set (e.g., O ⊂ Rd) for a finite time (T <∞) with strictly positive probability. Therefore
Q(τX > T ) > 0 and thus P(τX > T ) > 0.
3.1 Approximating MFGs
First, we define the approximating MFGs. Second, we prove the existence of feedback solu-
tions for these approximating models by extending the existence result of Campi and Fischer
[7]. In particular, with respect to the previous authors, we include the loss process L in
the drift and let the density of players µ be a flow of sub-probability measures, without
renormalizing it.
The approximating models. Let (Kn)n∈N ⊂ R+ be an increasing sequence such that Kn ր
+∞. The nth approximating MFG model, denoted by MFG(n), is obtained using the follow-
ing truncation procedure:
(Tn) w
n(x) = w(x) where |w(x)| ≤ Kn while it is continuously truncated at level Kn, i.e.
|wn(x)| = Kn, otherwise. Similarly for the drift and the costs b
n,fn, Fn.
Notice that neither the action space Γ (as is already compact) nor the possibly unbounded
open set O of non-absorbing states are truncated. Moreover, in the MFG(n) the representa-
tive player’s state evolves according to the following SDE:
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
(
u (s,X) + b¯n (s,Xs, L (s;µ) ,m
n (s;µ))
)
ds+ σWt (3.1)
for t ∈ [0, T ] and where now mn : [0, T ]×P(X )→ Rd is defined as the flow of the average of
wn. Still u ∈ Ufb and µ ∈ Υ
T
≤1,1. The associated cost functional is:
Jn,µ (u)
.
= E
[∫ τ
0
fn (s,Xs, L (s;µ) ,m
n (s;µ) , u (s,X)) ds+ Fn (τ,Xτ )
]
. (3.2)
We associate to the MFG(n)s the following Hamiltonians:
hn(t, x, l,m, z, u)
.
= fn(t, x, l,m, u) + z σ−1 bn(t, x, l,m, u)
Hn(t, x, l,m, z)
.
= inf
u∈Γ
hn(t, x, l,m, z, u)
and the set of minimizers:
An(t, x, l,m, z)
.
= {u ∈ Γ : hn(t, x, l,m, z, u) = Hn(t, x, l,m, z)}
for (t, x, l,m, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd×[0, 1]×Rd0×Rd. We make the following additional assumption:
(C1) For each n ∈ N, An(t, x, l,m, z) is convex for all (t, x, l,m, z) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × [0, 1] ×
Rd0 × Rd.
Remark 3.1. Assumption (C1) is common in control theory and it is crucial in order to
apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem (Aliprantis and Border [1], Corollary
17.55). It usually involves convexity or quasi-convexity of the Hamiltonians. In our case it
is trivially satisfied if, for instance, the running cost f is bounded and convex in the control
variable u ∈ Γ. Indeed in this case, due to the flexibility in the choice of the truncation
procedure, it is sufficient to choose Kn ≥ ‖f‖∞ for all n ∈ N so that f
n = f for all n ∈ N.
Then convexity is preserved by adding any sub-linear term.
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Theorem 3.2 (Existence of solutions of MFG(n)). Under assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (C1)
there exists a feedback solution (ν, un, µn) of MFG(n).
Proof. The proof follows similar steps to those in Section 6 of Campi and Fischer [7], therefore
we only sketch the relevant passages. The main difference with [7] is that, due to assumption
(C1), we have to deal with set-valued maps, hence to apply a version of Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem instead of Brouwer’s. We use the version proposed by Carmona and Lacker
[11], Proposition 7.4, which is in turn based on the results of Cellina [12]. Other adjustments
are due to the presence of the loss process L in the drift, the fact that µ is a flow of sub-
probability measures (instead of probability measures) and that O can be unbounded.
Fix n ∈ N. The proof is based on the construction of a suitable map Ψ : P(X ) ×
U → P(X ) on an appropriate compact and convex subset of P(X ), where U is the space of
progressively measurable Γ-valued stochastic processes. The fixed points of Ψ then provide
MFG(n) solutions. More in detail, let us consider
Ψ : Qν,Kn,0 × U ∋ (θ, u) 7→ P
θ,u ◦X−1 ∈ Qν,Kn,0,
where the probability measure Pθ,u is defined as follows. Let (θ, u) ∈ Qν,Kn,0 × U and let
µθ ∈ ΥT≤1 be defined as µ
θ
t (·)
.
= θ({Xt ∈ ·} ∩ {τ
X > t}) for all t ∈ [0, T ], where X is the
canonical process on X . Define (Ω,Fu, (Fut )t∈[0,T ],P
θ,u,X,W u) as the weak solution of
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
(
us + b¯
n
(
s,Xs, L(s;µ
θ),mn(s;µθ)
))
ds+ σW ut , t ∈ [0, T ],
on the canonical space (Ω
.
= X ,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P). Moreover, for θ ∈ Qν,Kn,0 we call u
θ an
optimal control for the cost
Jn,µ
θ
(u)
.
= EP
θ,u
[∫ τ
0
fn
(
s,Xs, L(s;µ
θ),mn(s;µθ), us
)
ds+ Fn (τ,Xτ )
]
.
Such optimal controls uθ can be constructed by standard BSDE techniques as in [7], Section
6.1 (by means of Theorem 3.4 in Darling and Pardoux [15], in order to deal with random
terminal times). Under assumption (C1) optimal controls uθ are in general not unique. Indeed
An(θ)
.
=
{
uθ ∈ U : uθ ∈ U ∈ An(·,X·, L(·;µ
θ),mn(·;µθ), Zθ· ), LT ⊗ P− a.s.
}
provides an entire set of optimal controls, where Zθ is part of the the solution of the associated
BSDE and LT denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Moreover, by measurable selection
there exists a measurable function uˆn,θ : [0, T ]× Rd × [0, 1] × Rd0 × Rd → Γ such that
uˆn,θ(t, x, l,m, z) ∈ An(t, x, l,m, z), (t, x, l,m, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × [0, 1] × Rd0 × Rd.
Hence uˆn,θ(t,Xt, L(t;µ
θ),mn(t;µθ), Zθt ), for t ∈ [0, T ], is a progressively measurable control
process that can be written in feedback form. Indeed, Zθ, being part of the solution of the
associated BSDE, is progressively measurable for the canonical filtration, hence Zθt = ζ
θ(t,X)
for some progressively measurable functional ζθ : [0, T ]× X → Rd and for t ∈ [0, T ].
Now, a fixed point for the map Ψ is a probability measure θ ∈ Qν,Kn,0 such that θ ∈
Ψ(θ,A(θ)). Existence is provided by Proposition 7.4 in [11] so to conclude the proof it suffices
to check that all the required assumptions are satisfied in our case. The set Qν,Kn,0 ⊂ P(X ) is
a (weakly) compact, convex and metrizable subset of C∗b (X ), the dual of the space of bounded
and continuous functions on X , which is a locally convex topological vector space with the
weak* topology (that induces the weak convergence of measures on P(X )). We endow the
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vector space U with the norm ‖·‖U defined as ‖u‖U
.
= E[
∫ T
0 |ut|dt]. As a consequence of
Berge’s maximum theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 17.31 in Aliprantis and Border [1]) and of
assumption (C1) the set-valued map An : Qν,Kn,0 → U is upper hemicontinuous and has
non-empty convex and closed values (see the proof of Lemma 7.11 in [11]). Finally, by
following the proof in Section 6.2 of [7] and that of Theorem 3.5 in [11], we obtain that Ψ is
continuous. For this step, Lemma 6.2 in [7] has to be replaced with our Lemma A.4, which
guarantees almost sure continuity of L and m.
Therefore, Proposition 7.4 in [11] applies, yielding the existence of a feedback solution of
MFG(n).
A-priori estimates. We ensure now that the moments up to any order α of the state pro-
cess remain bounded uniformly in n. Such estimates will be very useful when relaxing the
truncation by letting n→∞.
Lemma 3.2 (A-priori estimates). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (C1). Consider feed-
back solutions (ν, un, µn)n∈N and (ν, u, µ) of the MFG(n)’s and of the MFG, respectively.
Let (Ωn,Fn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],P
n,Xn,W n)n∈N be a sequence of weak solutions of the SDEs (3.1)
and (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,X,W ) a weak solution of the SDE (2.4). Then for any α ≥ 1,
sup
n∈N
EP
n
[‖Xn‖α∞] ≤ K (α) and E
P [‖X‖α∞] ≤ K (α) ,
where K(α) <∞ is a positive constant independent of n.
Proof. For the sake of readability, we omit the dependence on P in the expectations below.
Let α ≥ 1 and let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,X,W ) be a weak solution of the SDE in Eq.(2.4).
Then, using the linear growth of the drift we get:
E
[
‖X‖α∞,t
]
≤ C(α)
(
E [|ξ|α] + |σ|α E
[
‖W‖α∞,t
]
+ C(α, T, |Γ|)
)
+
+ C ′(α)C
∫ t
0
(
1 + E
[
‖X‖α∞,s
]
+ ‖m(· ;µ)‖α∞,s
)
ds
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and for some constants C(α), C ′(α), C(α, T, |Γ|) > 0. By assumption (H6),
E[|ξ|α] < ∞ for all α ≥ 1. In addition, ‖m(· ;µ)‖α∞,t ≤ C
′′(α)C(1 + E[‖X‖α∞,t]) for all
t ∈ [0, T ] and for some constant C ′′(α) > 0. Therefore, we conclude by using Grönwall’s
lemma. The same estimates hold also for any weak solution of Eq.(3.1).
Let (ν, un, µn)n∈N and (ν, u, µ) be feedback solutions of the MFG(n)s and of the MFG. We
now ensure that the corresponding mean and loss processes are continuous in time.
Lemma 3.3 (Continuity of the mean and loss processes). Let θ ∈ Qν,K,C. Define µ(·)
.
=
θ({Xt ∈ ·} ∩ {τ
X > t}), where X is the identity process on X . Then, the functions m(· ;µ) :
[0, T ]→ Rd0 and L(· ;µ) : [0, T ]→ [0, 1] are continuous.
Proof. We prove the continuity only for m(· ;µ) since a similar reasoning applies to L(· ;µ)
as well. By Lemma A.4 the mapping t 7→ 1[0,τX)(t), where X is the identity on X , is θ-
a.s. continuous and bounded. The function w is continuous and integrable with respect
to µt because of its linear growth and of the a-priori estimates. Moreover X has continuous
trajectories. Now let (tn)n∈N ⊂ [0, T ] converge to some t ∈ [0, T ]. Then w (Xtn) 1[0,τX)(tn)→
w (Xt)1[0,τX)(t) θ-a.s. and
Eθ
[
w (Xtn) 1[0,τX)(tn)
]
−→
n→∞
Eθ
[
w (Xt)1[0,τX)(t)
]
,
by the dominated convergence theorem.
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3.2 Convergence of the approximating MFGs
Let (ν, un, µn)n∈N be a sequence of feedback solutions of the approximating MFGs introduced
in the previous Subsection 3.1, whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 3.2. In addition, let
(Ωn,Fn, (Fnt )t∈[0,T ],P
n,Xn,W n)n∈N be a sequence of weak solutions of the SDEs in Eq.(3.1)
associated to (ν, un, µn)n∈N. Let θ
n be defined as θn
.
= Pn ◦ (Xn)−1 for each n ∈ N.
To prove the convergence of the approximating MFGs we proceed in the following way.
First, we show that there exists a subsequence of (θn)n∈N, say (θ
nk)nk∈N, that converges in
P1(X ) to some limit θ ∈ P1(X ). To prove this, we interpret (ν, u
n, µn)n∈N as relaxed feed-
back solutions, (ν, λn, µn)n∈N. Second, we show that also the sequence of the corresponding
extended laws (Θn)n∈N ⊂ P(X × V) converges in P1(X × V) to some limit Θ ∈ P1(X × V).
Here, a key role is played by Proposition 3.1 which ensures the absolute continuity of the limit
measures with respect to Wν . In this way, we are able to deal with the weak convergence
of measures even in the presence of the discontinuities induced by the first exit time of the
state processes from the set O. Finally, we characterize the limit points by means of the
martingale problem of Stroock and Varadhan (see Stroock and Varadhan [52, 53]).
Lemma 3.4 (Tightness). (θn)n∈N is tight in P(X ).
Proof. Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ] with t1 < t2. First, notice that the laws θ
n
0
.
= Pn ◦ (Xn0 )
−1 are
trivially tight since they are all equal to the same law ν. Second, by standard estimates and
by using Lemma 3.2 we have for all n ∈ N that:
EP
n [∣∣Xnt2 −Xnt1∣∣] ≤ |t2 − t1| (|Γ|+ C (1 +K + C(1 +K))) + |t2 − t1|1/2 |σ|CWT ,
where we set CWT
.
= EP[‖W‖∞,T ] with W a P Wiener process. We conclude by applying the
Kolmogorov-Chentsov criterion (see, e.g., Corollary 14.9 in Kallenberg [35]).
Corollary 3.1 (Relative compactness). (θn)n∈N is relatively compact in P(X ).
Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 3.4 and of Prohorov’s Theorem.
Now, let θ ∈ P(X ) be a limit point for (θn)n∈N and let (θ
nk)nk∈N be a subsequence of (θ
n)n∈N
such that θnk
w
⇀ θ as nk →∞. With a slight abuse of notation, in what follows we identify
(θnk)nk∈N with (θ
n)n∈N. We now show that the latter convergence is actually stronger by
proving that (θn)n∈N converges to θ in the 1-Wasserstein distance.
Lemma 3.5 (Convergence in the 1-Wasserstein distance). Let (θn)n∈N be as above. Then
W1(θ
n, θ)→ 0 and θ ∈ P1(X ).
Proof. Notice that by Lemma 3.2 (θn)n∈N ⊂ P1(X ). To prove convergence in the 1-Wasserstein
distance, we have to show that (see, for instance, Theorem 7.12.ii in Villani [55])
lim
R→∞
sup
n∈N
EP
n [
‖X‖∞1{‖X‖∞≥R}
]
= 0.
Set p, q > 1 such that 1p +
1
q = 1. Then, for any ǫ > 0 by Young’s and Markov’s inequalities,
and by Lemma 3.2 we have:
EP
n [
‖X‖∞1{‖X‖∞≥R}
]
≤ ǫp
EP
n
[‖X‖p∞]
p
+
Pn {‖X‖∞ ≥ R}
ǫqq
≤ ǫp
K(p)
p
+
K
ǫqqR
,
for some positive constants K(p) and K independent of n ∈ N. The conclusion immedi-
ately follow thanks to the fact that convergence in the 1-Wasserstein distance preserves the
finiteness of the first moment.
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Proposition 3.1 (Absolute continuity of limit measures). Let θ, (θn)n∈N ⊂ P1(X ) be as in
Lemma 3.5. Then θ is absolutely continuous with respect to Wν , i.e. θ ≪Wν .
Proof. By construction θn ≪Wν for all n ∈ N, hence we have to make sure that the absolute
continuity is also preserved at the limit. For doing so, we are going to apply Theorem VI.4.13
in Jacod and Shiryaev [34]. In particular, we have to verify that all assumptions therein are
fulfilled, which in our setting are reduced to the following properties:
(i) the contiguity of the sequence of θn with respect to the Wiener measure Wν , i.e. for
any sequence of measurable sets Bn with W
ν(Bn)→ 0 we have θ
n(Bn)→ 0 as n→∞
(see, e.g., Definition V.1.1 in [34]);
(ii) the tightness of the sequence ofWν -martingales (Mn)n∈N, where eachM
n = (Mnt )t∈[0,T ]
is defined as:
Mnt
.
= Et
(∫ ·
0
σ−1
(
un(s,X) + b¯n(s,Xs, L(s; θ
n),mn(s; θn))
)
dWs
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
In order to check property (i), we first show that the sequence of Radon-Nikodym derivatives
( dθ
n
dWν )n∈N is uniformly integrable under W
ν . This is a consequence of the following bound
sup
n∈N
EW
ν
[(
dθn
dWν
)p]
<∞, p ∈ [1,∞), (3.3)
which follows from Corollary A.1 and by the fact that, by bounds in Grigelionis and Macke-
vičius [28] and by Lemma 3.2 all upper bounds are uniform in n ∈ N.
Now, property (i) can be obtained as follows: for all sequences of measurable sets Bn with
Wν(Bn)→ 0, we have
θn(Bn) = E
Wν
[
dθn
dWν
1Bn
]
→ 0, n→∞,
by an application of dominated convergence theorem due to the bound (3.3). Hence the
sequence of measures θn is contiguous to Wν .
Property (ii) follows from Aldous criterion (Condition VI.4.4 in [34]) that is:
lim
δ→0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
τ≤σ≤τ+δ
Wν (|Mnσ −M
n
τ | ≥ r) = 0 (3.4)
for all r > 0 and where τ and σ are stopping times bounded by T . As a consequence, we
will also have the tightness property for the pair (X,Mn)n∈N under the measure W
ν . By
Theorem VI.4.13 in [34] it is sufficient to check the tightness property for the corresponding
quadratic variation processes:
〈Mn〉t =
∫ t
0
∣∣σ−1 (un(s,X) + b¯n(s,Xs, L(s; θn),mn(s; θn)))Mns ∣∣2 ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
First, by Markov’s inequality Wν(|〈Mn〉σ − 〈M
n〉τ | ≥ r) ≤
1
rE
Wν [|Mnσ −M
n
τ |]. Then, by
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Young’s inequality for all p, q > 1 such that 1p +
1
q = 1 we have:
EW
ν
[|〈Mn〉σ − 〈M
n〉τ |] ≤
≤ EW
ν
[∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
∣∣σ−1∣∣2 ∣∣(un(s,X) + b¯n(s,Xs, L(s; θn),mn(s; θn)))∣∣2 |Mns |2 ds
]
≤
1
p
∣∣σ−1∣∣2 ∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
EW
ν
[∣∣(un(s,X) + b¯n(s,Xs, L(s; θn),mn(s; θn)))∣∣2p] ds
+
1
q
∣∣σ−1∣∣2 ∫ (τ+δ)∧T
τ
EW
ν
[
|Mns |
2q
]
ds
≤
(
K(p)
p
+
K(q)
q
) ∣∣σ−1∣∣2 ((τ + δ) ∧ T − τ)
for some positive constants K(p) and K(q) > 0 independent of n ∈ N. Notice that the last
inequality is a consequence of Lemma 3.2 and Property (i). Therefore, Aldous criterion in
Eq.(3.4) is satisfied.
After checking properties (i) and (ii) above, we can at last apply Theorem X.3.3 in [34],
yielding that tightness of (Wν ◦ (X,Mn)−1)n∈N implies the tightness of (θ
n ◦ (X,Mn)−1)n∈N.
In particular, if (Wν ◦ (X,Mn)−1)n∈N weakly converges to some Θ
′ in P(X ×X ) then (θn ◦
(X,Mn)−1)n∈N weakly converges to some other Θ
′′ ≪ Θ′ in P(X × X ), and the same holds
true for their first marginals on X . Therefore, we can conclude that θ ≪Wν .
Compactification method. So far, we have established the convergence of the laws (θn)n∈N to
some limit law θ in the 1-Wasserstein distance. Now, in order to prove the convergence of the
approximating feedback solutions (ν, un, µn)n∈N to some feedback MFG solution (ν, u, µ),
we need to show that the sequence of optimal controls (un)n∈N converges to a control u,
which is optimal for the limit game. To do this, we interpret the sequence of strict feedback
solutions (ν, un, µn)n∈N as a sequence of relaxed feedback solutions (ν, λ
n, µn)n∈N, by defining
λn : [0, T ] × X → P(Γ) as λn(t, ϕ)
.
= δun(t,ϕ) for all (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ] × X and for all n ∈
N. Furthermore, we identify each λn with a stochastic relaxed control Λn. We then fix
a sequence of associated weak solutions (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],Q
n,Xn,W n) of Eq.(2.8) and set
Θn
.
= Qn ◦ (Xn,Λn)−1 ∈ P(X × V) for all n ∈ N. Finally, we associate to each MFG(n) and
to the limit MFG a martingale problem (Stroock and Varadhan [52, 53]) and show that the
limit points Θ ∈ P(X × V) of (Θn)n∈N solve the limit relaxed martingale problem. We start
with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6 (Relative compactness). (Θn)n∈N is relatively compact in P(X × V).
Proof. This is a consequence of the relative compactness of (θn)n∈N in P(X ) in Lemma 3.1
and of the compactness of V, and hence of P(V).
Now, let Θ ∈ P(X × V) be a limit point for (Θn)n∈N and let (Θ
nk)nk∈N be a subsequence
of (Θn)n∈N such that Θ
nk w⇀ Θ for nk → ∞. We now show that the latter convergence
is actually stronger by proving that (Θn)n∈N converges to Θ in the 1-Wasserstein distance.
Again, with a slight abuse of notation, we identify (Θnk)nk∈N with (Θ
n)n∈N.
Lemma 3.7 (Convergence in the 1-Wasserstein distance). Let (Θn)n∈N be as above. Then
W1(Θ
n,Θ)→ 0 and Θ ∈ P1(X × V).
Proof. By Lemma 3.5 (Θn ◦ X−1)n∈N ⊂ P1(X ) is relatively compact in P1(X ). Set now
|θ|α
.
=
∫
E |x|
αθ(dx) for all θ ∈ P(E), E a Polish space. Then it holds that:
sup
n∈N
EQ
n
[∫ T
0
|Λt|
α dt
]
≤ T |Γ|α .
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We conclude thanks to Proposition B.3 in Lacker [38].
Proposition 3.2 (Absolute continuity of limit measures). Let Θ, (Θn)n∈N ⊂ P1(X × V) be
as in Lemma 3.7. Then Θ ◦X−1 ≪Wν .
Proof. This is a consequence of Proposition 3.1, the fact that by construction θn = Θn ◦X−1
for all n ∈ N, and the fact that weak convergence of the joint law implies weak convergence
of the marginals.
Finally, to characterize the limit points of (Θn)n∈N, we associate to each approximating
MFG(n) and limit MFG a martingale problem, henceforth RM(n) and RM respectively.
Then, we show that limit points Θ are solutions of RM.
We need some further preliminary notation for the definition of (approximating) martin-
gale problem. Similarly to the definition of b in Eq.(2.6) we set bn : [0, T ]×X×M≤1(X )×Γ→
Rd as
bn(t, ϕ, θ, u)
.
= u+ b¯n(t, ϕ(t), L(t; θ),mn(t; θ)).
Definition 3.1. The approximating martingale problems (RM(n)). We say that Θ̂ ∈ P(X ×
V) is a solution of RM(n) if for all g ∈ C2c (R
d) the following process
M
n,g
t (ϕ, q; Θ̂)
.
= g(ϕ(t)) − g(ϕ(0)) −
∫
[0,t]×Γ
bn(s, ϕ, θˆ, u)∇g(ϕ(s))q(ds, du)
+
1
2
∫ t
0
d∑
i,j=1
(
σσT
)
i,j
∂2g(ϕ(s))
∂xi∂xj
ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a Θ̂-martingale, where θˆ
.
= Θ̂ ◦X−1 and X is the identity process on X .
Observe that, by construction, each Θn solves RM(n). In Proposition 3.3, instead, we char-
acterize the limit points as solutions of the following relaxed martingale problem.
Definition 3.2. The limit martingale problem (RM).We say that Θ̂ ∈ P(X ×V) is a solution
of RM if for all g ∈ C2c (R
d) the following process
M
g
t (ϕ, q; Θ̂)
.
= g(ϕ(t)) − g(ϕ(0)) −
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s, ϕ, θˆ, u)∇g(ϕ(s))q(ds, du)
+
1
2
∫ t
0
d∑
i,j=1
(
σσT
)
i,j
∂2g(ϕ(s))
∂xi∂xj
ds, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a Θ̂-martingale, where θˆ
.
= Θ̂ ◦X−1 and X is the identity process on X .
Remark 3.2. The martingale property in both RM(n) and in RM is intended on (X ×
V,B(X × V)) with respect to the Θ-augmentation of the canonical filtration made right
continuous by a standard procedure. However, to conclude it is sufficient to check that the
martingale property holds with respect to the canonical filtration on X ×V (see, for instance,
Problem 5.4.13 in Karatzas and Shreve [36]).
We now characterize the limit points via the martingale problems.
Proposition 3.3 (Characterization of limit points via martingale problems). Θ solves RM
as in Definition 3.2.
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Proof. Fix t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], t1 < t2, g ∈ C
2
c (R
d) and ψ ∈ Cb(X × V) measurable with respect to
Bt1(X × V). Define Ψ,Ψ
n : P(X × V)→ R as:
Ψ
(
Θ′; Θ
) .
= EΘ
′ [
ψ
(
M
g
t2(· ; Θ)−M
g
t1(· ; Θ)
)]
,
Ψn
(
Θ′; Θ
) .
= EΘ
′ [
ψ
(
M
n,g
t2 (· ; Θ)−M
n,g
t1 (· ; Θ)
)]
,
for Θ′,Θ ∈ P(X × V) and for all n ∈ N. Ψn(Θn; Θn) = 0 for all n ∈ N hence trivially
Ψn(Θn; Θn) → 0 as n → ∞. We need to prove that Ψn(Θn; Θn) → Ψ(Θ;Θ) as n → ∞. To
do so, we show that both summands on the right-hand side of:
|Ψn (Θn; Θn)−Ψ(Θ;Θ)| ≤ |Ψn (Θn; Θn)−Ψ(Θn; Θ)|+ |Ψ(Θn; Θ)−Ψ(Θ;Θ)| .
vanish as n→∞.
Step 1. We show that |Ψn(Θn; Θn)−Ψ(Θn; Θ)| → 0 as n→∞. Notice thatΨn(Θn; Θn)−
Ψ(Θn; Θ) = EΘ
n
[ψ∆Mn,gt1,t2 ], where we set:
∆Mn,gt1,t2(ϕ, q)
.
=
∫
[t1,t2]×Γ
(bn(t, ϕ, θn, u)− b(t, ϕ, θ, u)) q(dt, du),
for all (ϕ, q) ∈ X×V. Using the Lipschitz continuity of the drifts and the truncation described
in (Tn), we have:
∣∣ψ∆Mn,gt1,t2(ϕ, q)∣∣ ≤ CψC∇gL ∫ t2
t1
(|L(t; θn)− L(t; θ)|+ |mn(t; θn)−m(t; θ)|) dt
+ CψC∇g
∫ t2
t1
b¯(t, ϕ(t), L(t; θ),m(t; θ))1{|b¯|≥Kn}dt, (3.5)
for all (ϕ, q) ∈ X ×V and where Cψ, C∇g > 0 are two uniform bounds for |ψ| and |∇g|. Now,
let us admit for the moment the following two continuity properties:
(i) L(t; θn)→ L(t; θ) as n→∞,
(ii) mn(t; θn)→ m(t; θ) as n→∞,
that will be checked at the end of this proof. Properties (i) and (ii) above guarantee the
convergence to zero (as n → ∞) of the first summand in the right-hand side of inequality
(3.5). Therefore, in order to perform this step of the proof, it is sufficient to show that:∫
X×V
∫ t2
t1
b¯(t, ϕ(t), L(t; θ),m(t; θ))1{|b¯|≥Kn}dtΘ
n(dϕ, dq) −→
n→∞
0.
To do that, set p, q > 1 such that 1p +
1
q = 1. Then, for any ǫ > 0 by Young’s and Markov’s
inequalities:
EΘ
n
[∫ t2
t1
b¯(t, ·, L(t; θ),m(t; θ))1{|b¯|≥Kn}dt
]
≤
(
ǫpCpK(p)
p
+
K
Knǫqq
)
(t2 − t1) (3.6)
for some positive constants K(p) and K > 0 independent of n ∈ N (see Lemma 3.2).
To conclude this step of the proof, we need to check properties (i) and (ii). We denote
by D1[0,τ)(t) the set of discontinuity points of the map φ 7→ 1[0,τ(φ))(t) for t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof of (i). By Corollary 3.1, θn
w
⇀ θ. Then:
L(t; θn)− L(t; θ) = −
∫
X
1[0,τ(φ))(t) (θ
n − θ) (dφ) −→
n→∞
0
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for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This follows from the definition of weak convergence of measures and the
fact that θ(D1[0,τ)(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] by Proposition 3.1 and Lemma A.4.(d).
Proof of (ii). By Lemma 3.5, W1(θ
n, θ)→ 0. In addition:
|mn(t; θn)−m(t; θ)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∫
X
w(φ(t))1{|w|≥Kn}1[0,τ(φ))(t)θ
n(dφ)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∫
X
w(φ(t))1[0,τ(φ))(t) (θ
n − θ) (dφ)
∣∣∣∣ −→n→∞ 0,
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Indeed, the first term converges to zero as n → ∞ by applying Young and
Markov’s inequalities as in Eq.(3.6). On the other hand, the vanishing of the second term as
n → ∞ is a consequence of the convergence in the 1-Wasserstein distance, Theorem 7.12.iv
in Villani [55], and the fact that θ(D1[0,τ)(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] by Proposition 3.1 and
Lemma A.4.(d).
Step 2. The fact that |Ψ(Θn; Θ) − Ψ(Θ;Θ)| → 0 as n → ∞ is a consequence of
W1(Θ
n,Θ)→ 0 and of Theorem 7.12.iv in Villani [55].
Corollary 3.2 (Representation of limit points). Let Θ be a solution of RM, as in Definition
3.2. Then there exists a weak solution (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,t],Q,X,Λ,W ) of
Xt = X0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b (s,X, θ, u) Λs(du)ds + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ], (3.7)
such that Θ is the law of (X,Λ) under Q and θ = Θ ◦X−1.
Proof. See, for instance, Proposition 5.4.6 and Corollary 5.4.8 in Karatzas and Shreve [36].
3.3 Optimality of the limit points
In this subsection, we show that any limit point Θ ∈ P(X×V) of (Θn)n∈N is optimal according
to the cost functional of the MFG. Moreover, we extend our notion of relaxed MFG solution
further, in order to include controls that are in general not in feedback form. In this case we
evaluate optimality according to the following cost functional:
J µ (Λ)
.
= E
[∫
[0,τ ]×Γ
f (s,X, µ, u) Λs(du)ds + F (τ,Xτ )
]
for Λ relaxed stochastic control and where τ
.
= τX ∧ T , subject to the following dynamics:
Xt = X0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b (s,X, µ, u) Λs(du)ds + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.8)
We set V µ = infΛ J
µ(Λ). The latter minimization is actually performed over the set of re-
laxed stochastic open-loop controls, i.e. over the tuples (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],Q,X,Λ,W ) that are
weak solutions of Eq.(3.7) and where Λ is a progressively measurable P(Γ)-valued stochastic
process. Nonetheless, for simplicity of notation, we write Λ also when we refer to tuples.
Moreover, when working on the canonical space X × V, where the canonical process (X,Λ)
is completely characterized by its law Θ, we will simply identify relaxed stochastic controls
with their laws and write Jµ(Θ) in place of Jµ(Λ).
Definition 3.3 (Relaxed MFG solution). A relaxed solution of the MFG is a triplet (ν,Λ, µ)
such that:
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(i) ν ∈ P(Rd) with supp(ν) ⊂ O, Λ is a relaxed stochastic control and µ ∈ ΥT≤1,1.
(ii) Λ is optimal, i.e. V µ = Jµ(Λ).
(iii) Let (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],Q,X,W ) be a weak solution of Eq.(3.7) with flow of sub-probability
measures µ, stochastic control Λ and initial condition ν. Then
µt(·) = Q({Xt ∈ ·} ∩ {τ
X > t}), t ∈ [0, T ].
Proposition 3.4 (Existence of relaxed MFG solutions). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and
(C1). Let Θ be a limit point of (Θn)n∈N in P1(X × V). Set µ ∈ Υ
T
≤1,1 as
µt (·)
.
= Θ
(
{Xt ∈ ·} ∩
{
τX > t
})
t ∈ [0, T ].
Then (ν,Θ, µ) is a relaxed MFG solution according to Definition 3.3.
Proof. Property (i) in Definition 3.3 is satisfied by construction. Property (iii), instead, is a
consequence of the fact that Θ is a solution of RM as in Definition 3.2. To prove Property
(ii), we proceed through the following steps:
(j) Let Θ˜ ∈ P(X × V) be a solution of RM. Then there exists a sequence of solutions
(Θ˜n)n∈N of RM(n) such that limn→∞ J
µn(Θ˜n) = Jµ(Θ˜).
(jj) limn→∞ J
µn(Θn) = Jµ(Θ).
(jjj) Jµ(Θ) ≤ Jµ(Θ˜) for any Θ˜ ∈ P(X × V) solution of RM.
The proof of (j) − (jjj) largely follows that of Theorem 3.6 in Lacker [38]. Therefore, in
what follow we highlight only the main differences between the two results, which are due
to the sub-linear growth of the drift and cost-functional, and to the history dependence and
discontinuities induced in the coefficients by the presence of the first exit time from the set
O.
Proof of (j). Let Θ˜ ∈ P(X × V) be a solution of RM. We construct a sequence of
solutions (Θ˜n)n∈N ⊂ P(X × V) of RM(n) such that Θ˜
n w⇀ Θ˜. Toward this aim, let
(Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ], Θ˜,X,Λ,W ) be a weak solution of Eq.(3.7) on the canonical space Ω˜ =
X × V. The existence of this solution is guaranteed by Corollary 3.2. Now fix Λ and let
(Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ], Θ˜,X
n,Λ,W )n∈N be a sequence of strong solutions of:
Xnt = ξ +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
bn (s,Xns , L(s;µ
n),m(s;µn), u) Λs(du)ds + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ].
Set Θ˜n
.
= Θ˜ ◦ (Xn,Λ)−1 for each n ∈ N. Notice (Θ˜n)n∈N ⊂ P1(X × V). Moreover each Θ˜
n
solves RM(n) as in Definition 3.1. We now show that:
EΘ˜ [‖Xn −X‖∞] −→
n→∞
0 and W1(Θ˜
n, Θ˜) −→
n→∞
0. (3.9)
Regarding the first limit, it is sufficient to note that:
EΘ˜ [‖Xn −X‖∞,t] ≤ L
∫ t
0
EΘ˜ [‖Xn −X‖∞,s] ds+ E
Θ˜
[∫
[0,t]×Γ
∆bn(s, u)Λs(du)ds
]
,
where we set
∆bn(t, u)
.
= |bn(t,Xt, L(t;µ
n),mn(t;µn), u)− b(t,Xt, L(t, µ),m(t;u), u)|.
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The first term converges to zero by Grönwall’s Lemma, whereas the second by applying a
similar argument as in the first step of the proof of Proposition 3.3. Regarding the second
limit in Eq.(3.9), the first limit in the same equation implies convergence in probability, and
therefore in law, of Xn to X (see, for instance, Theorem 13.7 in Williams [56]). Thus, by an
argument similar to that of Lemma 3.7 we can prove the convergence in the 1-Wasserstein
distance. At this point, the convergence of the costs is a consequence of: i) the convergence in
the 1-Wasserstein distance; ii) the sub-linearity of the running cost combined with Theorem
7.12.iv in Villani [55]; iii) Lemma A.4 applied to Θ˜ ◦X−1 ∈ Qν,|Γ|,C; iv) Lemma A.5. Indeed
the running and the terminal costs have sub-linear growth and the set of their discontinuity
points has measure zero with respect to the limit measure.
Proof of (jj) This follows from an argument similar to the second part of (j).
Proof of (jjj) Let Θ˜ ∈ P(X × V) be a solution of RM and (Θ˜n)n∈N ⊂ P(X × V) an
approximating sequence as in (j). By the optimality of Θn we have
Jn,µ
n
(Θn) ≤ Jn,µ
n
(
Θ˜n
)
,
for all n ∈ N. The optimality of Θ follows by taking the limit inferior for n → ∞ in both
sides of the inequality above.
3.4 Existence of solutions
We conclude the proof of Theorem 3.1, by proving the existence of a relaxed feedback MFG
solution and, under additional convexity assumptions (Filippov [21], Haussmann and Le-
peltier [32]), the existence of a strict feedback MFG solution. In addition, we also prove
existence of solutions that are Markovian up to the exit time.
Relaxed feedback MFG solutions The main mathematical tool here is the mimicking result
of Brunick and Shreve [6]. We follow the procedure in Lacker [38] but with modifications due
the peculiarities of our model induced mainly by the presence of absorptions. We give more
details in the proof below.
Proposition 3.5 (Existence of relaxed feedback MFG solutions). Grant assumptions (H1)-
(H8) and (C1). Let (ν,Θ, µ) be a relaxed MFG solution according to Definition 3.3. Then
there exist another relaxed MFG solution (ν,Θ′, µ) and a progressively measurable functional
λ : [0, T ] × X → P(Γ) such that Θ′((ϕ, q) ∈ X × V : qt = λ(t, ϕ)) = 1 for Lebesgue-a.e.
t ∈ [0, T ] and Jµ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ, i.e. (ν, λ, µ) is a relaxed and feedback solution of the
MFG according to Definition 2.4.
Proof. We adapt to our setting the proof of Theorem 3.7 in Lacker [38], by exploiting the
mimicking result in Corollary 3.11 of Brunick and Shreve [6] instead of Corollary 3.7 as in
[38]. As a consequence, the mimicking process that we get is not Markovian as in Lacker.
However, it has the same law of the original process. In particular, equality in law is needed
due to the history dependence induced by the the presence of the first exit time from the set
O.
We start with the construction of λ by disintegration. Precisely, define η ∈ P([0, T ] ×
X × Γ) as:
η (I ×B ×G)
.
=
1
T
EΘ
[∫
[0,T ]×Γ
1(I×B×G) (t,X, u) Λ (dt, du)
]
and disintegrate it as η(dt, dφ, du) = η˜(dt, dφ)λt,φ(du). Then:
η (I ×B ×G) =
∫
[0,T ]×X×
∫
Γ
1(I×B×G) (t, φ, u) η˜ (dt, dφ) λt,φ (du)
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for all I ∈ B([0, T ]), B ∈ B(X ) and G ∈ B(Γ). By the disintegration Theorem, (t, φ) 7→
λt,φ(·) ∈ P(Γ) is Borel-measurable. Now set F˜
X
t
.
= σ(Xs, s ∈ [0, t]) for each t ∈ [0, T ]. We
claim that:
λt,X (·) = E
Θ
[
Λt (·)
∣∣F˜Xt ] Θ-a.s. and for Lebesgue-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] (3.10)
which is measurable and adapted, hence it has a progressively measurable modification λ.
We show that for any bounded measurable functional g : [0, T ] × X × Γ → R such that
g(t, ·, u) ∈ F˜Xt for all t ∈ [0, T ] and u ∈ Γ∫
Γ
g (t,X, u) λt,X (du) =
∫
Γ
g (t,X, u)EΘ
[
Λt (du)
∣∣F˜Xt ]
Θ-a.s. and for Lebesgue-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. Indeed, for any other bounded measurable functional
h : [0, T ]× X → R such that h(t, ·) ∈ F˜Xt for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
1
T
EΘ
[∫ T
0
h (t,X)
∫
Γ
g (t,X, u) λt,X (du) dt
]
(3.11)
=
∫
[0,T ]×X
h (t, φ)
∫
Γ
g (t, φ, u) λt,φ (du) η˜ (dt, dφ)
=
∫
[0,T ]×X×Γ
h (t, φ) g (t, φ, u) η (dt, dφ, du)
=
1
T
EΘ
[∫ T
0
h (t,X)
∫
Γ
g (t,X, u) Λt (du) dt
]
where the first equality comes from the definition of η˜, the second one is due to the disinte-
gration of η and the third one holds by definition of η.
Now, let (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,T ],Q,W,X,Λ) be a weak solution of Eq.(3.8) with relaxed control Θ =
Q◦(X,Λ)−1. By Corollary 3.11 in [6] there exists a weak solution (Ω˜′, F˜ ′, (F˜ ′t)t∈[0,T ],Q
′,W ′,X ′)
of
X ′t = ξ +
∫ t
0
∫
Γ
b
(
s,X ′s, L(s;µ),m(s;µ), u
)
λs,X′(du)ds + σW
′
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
such that Q′ ◦X ′−1 = Q ◦X−1. Define Θ′
.
= Q′ ◦ (X ′,Λ′)−1 where Λ′(dt, du)
.
= dtλt,X′(du).
Notice that if µ′ is the flow of sub-probability measures associated to Θ′ then µ′ = µ. Finally,
Θ′ solves the same relaxed martingale problem as Θ, and it has the same cost as Θ as required:
Jµ
(
Θ′
)
= EQ
′
[∫ τ ′
0
∫
Γ
f
(
t,X ′t, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u
)
λt,X′ (du) dt+ F
(
τ ′,X ′τ
)]
= EQ
[∫ τ
0
∫
Γ
f (t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u) λt,X (du) dt+ F (τ,Xτ )
]
= EQ
[∫ τ
0
∫
Γ
f (t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u)E
Q
[
Λt (du)
∣∣F˜Xt ] dt+ F (τ,Xτ )]
= EQ
[∫ τ
0
∫
Γ
EQ
[
f (t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u) Λt (du)
∣∣F˜Xt ] dt+ F (τ,Xτ )]
= EQ
[∫
[0,τ ]×Γ
f (t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u) Λ (dt, du) + F (τ,Xτ )
]
= Jµ (Θ) .
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Remark 3.3. We observe that, due to the discontinuity induced by the exit time τ , it is
not possible in general to apply Theorem 3.6 of Brunick and Shreve [6] to Zt = (Xt, I[0,τ)(t)),
t ∈ [0, T ], to obtain a control which is Markovian in Z. Moreover the few mimicking results
available in the literature for discontinuous processes hold under very restrictive or hardly ver-
ifiable assumptions. Nonetheless, Theorem 3.6 in [6] could still be applied in some particular
cases when, for instance, O = (0,∞) and Zt = (Xt, infs∈[0,t]Xs).
Strict feedback MFG solutions Under additional convexity assumptions (Filippov [21], Hauss-
mann and Lepeltier [32]), we prove existence of feedback MFG solutions that can be written in
strict form. Toward this aim, let (ν,Θ, µ) be a relaxed MFG solution according to Definition
3.3 and for all (t, ϕ, u) ∈ [0, T ]× X × Γ set:
b˜(t, ϕ, µ, u)
.
= b(t, ϕ(t), L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u),
f˜(t, ϕ, µ, u)
.
= f(t, ϕ(t), L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u).
For each (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ]× X define K(t, ϕ, µ) as:
K (t, ϕ, µ)
.
=
{(
b˜ (t, ϕ, µ, u) , z
)
: z ≥ f˜ (t, ϕ, µ, u) and u ∈ Γ
}
.
Existence of strict MFG solutions is established under the following additional convexity
assumption:
(C2) The running cost f is convex in the control variable u ∈ Γ.
Remark 3.4. Assumption (C2) is equivalent to requiring that the set K(t, ϕ, µ) is convex.
This assumption is crucial to apply the measurable selection argument in Haussmann and
Lepeltier [32], Dufour and Stockbridge [19].
Proposition 3.6 (Existence of strict feedback MFG solutions). Grant assumptions (H1)-
(H8), (C1) and assumption (C2). Let (ν,Θ, µ) be a relaxed MFG solution according to Def-
inition 3.3. Then there exists another relaxed MFG solution (ν,Θ′, µ) and a progressively
measurable functional u ∈ Ufb such that Θ
′((ϕ, q) ∈ X × V : qt = δu(t,ϕ)) = 1 for Lebesgue-
a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] and Jµ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ, i.e. (ν, u, µ) is a strict and feedback solution of
the MFG according to Definition 2.2.
Proof. Again, we follow the proof of Theorem 3.7 in Lacker [38], highlighting the main dif-
ferences due to our different setting. The first part of the proof proceeds as in Proposition
3.5. Since for all (t, φ) ∈ [0, T ] × X the pair (b˜(t, φ, µ, u), f˜ (t, φ, µ, u)) is in K(t, φ, µ) for all
u ∈ Γ and K(t, φ, µ) is convex then also:∫
Γ
(
b˜ (t, φ, µ, u) , f˜ (t, φ, µ, u)
)
λt,φ(du) ∈ K (t, φ, µ) .
By applying the measurable selection argument in Haussmann and Lepeltier [32], Dufour
and Stockbridge [19] (with respect to the progressive σ-algebra, i.e. the σ-algebra generated
by progressively measurable processes), we find a progressively measurable functional u :
[0, T ]× X → Γ such that:∫
Γ
b˜ (t, φ, µ, u) λt,φ(du) = b˜ (t, φ, µ, u(t, φ))
and: ∫
Γ
f˜ (t, φ, µ, u) λt,φ(du) ≥ f˜ (t, φ, µ, u(t, φ))
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for all (t, φ) ∈ [0, T ]×X . Define Θ′
.
= Q′◦(X ′,Λ′)−1 where Q′ is as in the proof of Proposition
3.5 and Λ′(φ, q)(dt, du)
.
= dtδu(t,φ)(du). Θ
′ solves the same relaxed martingale problem as Θ.
As for the costs
Jµ
(
Θ′
)
= EQ
′
[∫ τ ′
0
∫
Γ
f
(
t,X ′t, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u
)
δu(t,X′)(du)dt+ F
(
τ,X ′τ
)]
= EQ
′
[∫ τ ′
0
f
(
t,X ′t, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u(t,X
′)
)
dt+ F
(
τ,X ′τ
)]
≤ EQ
′
[∫ τ ′
0
∫
Γ
f
(
t,X ′t, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u
)
λt,X′(du)dt+ F
(
τ,X ′τ
)]
= EQ
[∫ τ
0
∫
Γ
f (t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u) λt,X (du) dt+ F (τ,Xτ )
]
= EQ
[∫
[0,τ ]×Γ
f (t,Xt, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u) Λ (dt, du) + F (τ,Xτ )
]
= Jµ (Θ) .
Given the optimality of (ν,Θ, µ) we already have the converse inequality, i.e. Jµ(Θ) ≤ Jµ(Θ′).
Hence Jµ(Θ) = Jµ(Θ′).
We can finally give the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (C1). Proposition 3.4 guarantees
existence of a relaxed MFG solution (ν,Θ, µ) according to Definition 3.3. By Proposition 3.5
there exists another relaxed MFG solution (ν,Θ′, µ) and a progressively measurable functional
λ : [0, T ] × X → P(Γ) such that Θ′((ϕ, q) ∈ X × V : qt = λ(t, ϕ)) = 1 for Lebesgue-a.e.
t ∈ [0, T ] and Jµ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ. Then (ν, λ, µ) is a relaxed and feedback solution of the
MFG according to Definition 2.4.
Additionally grant assumption (C2). By Proposition 3.6 there exists another relaxed MFG
solution (ν,Θ′, µ) and a progressively measurable functional u ∈ Ufb such that Θ
′((ϕ, q) ∈
X × V : qt = δu(t,ϕ)) = 1 for Lebesgue-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] and J
µ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ. Then
(ν, u, µ) is a strict and feedback solution of the MFG according to Definition 2.2.
Markovian MFG solutions We conclude this part with showing that there exist relaxed and
strict feedback solutions that are Markovian up to the exit time.
Lemma 3.8 (Markovian MFG solutions). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (C1). Let
(ν,Θ, µ) be a relaxed MFG solution according to Definition 3.3. Then there exist another
relaxed MFG solution (ν,Θ′, µ) and a function λ : [0, T ]× Rd → P(Γ) such that
LT ⊗Θ
′({(t, ϕ, q) : qt = λ(t, ϕ(t)), t ≤ τ
X(ϕ)}) = 1,
where LT is the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ], and J
µ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ. Additionally, grant
assumption (C2). Then there exists a function u : [0, T ]× Rd → Γ such that
LT ⊗Θ
′({(t, ϕ, q) : qt = δu(t,ϕ(t)), t ≤ τ
X(ϕ)}) = 1,
and Jµ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ.
Proof. We define the following processes:
Yt
.
= (t,Xt), X
τX
t
.
= Xt∧τX , Y
τX
t
.
= Yt∧τX ,
25
for t ∈ [0, T ]. If X satisfies Eq.(3.7) with flow of sub-probability measures µ and relaxed
control Λ then the SDE satisfied by Xτ
X
is (on the same probability space)
Xτ
X
t = ξ +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b
(
s,Xτ
X
s , L(s;µ),m(s;µ), u
)
1[0,τX)(s)Λs(du)ds
+σ
∫ t
0
1[0,τX)(s)dWs, t ∈ [0, T ].
Notice that until t ≤ τX the stopped processXτ
X
coincides pathwise with the original process
X. We now apply the mimicking result in Corollary 3.7 of Brunick and Shreve [6], to the
stopped process Y τ
X
. To this end, we follow the proof of Theorem 3.7 in Lacker [38] and the
proofs of Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 in the present paper.
First, we claim that there exists a measurable function λ : [0, T ]× Rd+1 → P(Γ) such that
λ
t,Y τ
X
t
(·) = EΘ
[
Λt(·)
∣∣Y τXt ] , Θ-a.s. and for Lebesgue-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
and we construct it by disintegration. Let η ∈ P([0, T ] × Rd+1 × Γ) as
η(B)
.
=
1
T
EΘ
[∫
[0,T ]×Γ
1C
(
t, Y τ
X
t , u
)
Λ(dt, du)
]
.
We define λ through η(dt, dy, du)
.
= η˜(dt, dy)λt,y(du). By Corollary 3.7 in [6] applied to
λ
t,Y τ
X
t
there exists a weak solution (Ω˜′, F˜ ′, (F˜ ′t)t∈[0,T ],Q
′,W ′,X ′) of
X ′t = ξ +
∫ t
0
∫
Γ
b
(
s,X ′s, L(s;µ),m(s;µ), u
)
1[0,τX′)(s)λs,Y τX
′
t
(du)ds
+σ
∫ t
0
1[0,τX′)(s)dW
′
s, t ∈ [0, T ],
where Y τ
X′
t
.
= (t ∧ τX
′
,X ′t) and Q
′ ◦ (t ∧ τX
′
,X ′t)
−1 = Q ◦ (t ∧ τX ,Xτ
X
t )
−1 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
i.e. Y τ
X′
and Y τ
X
have the same time marginals. Now set τ ′
.
= τX
′
∧ T . Recall that
Θ = Q ◦ (X,Λ)−1 and define Θ′
.
= Q′ ◦ (X ′,Λ′)−1 where Λ′(dt, du)
.
= dtλ
t,Y τ
X′
t
(du). Equality
of the costs can be shown just as in the proof of Proposition 3.5:
Jµ
(
Θ′
)
= EQ
′
[∫ τ ′
0
∫
Γ
f(t,X ′t, L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u)λt,t∧τX′ ,X′t
(du)dt+ F
(
τ ′,X ′τ
)]
= EQ
[∫ τ
0
∫
Γ
f(t,Xτ
X
t , L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u)λt,t∧τX ,XτXt
(u)dt+ F
(
τ,Xτ
X
τ
)]
= EQ
[∫
[0,τ ]×Γ
f(t,Xτ
X
t , L(t;µ),m(t;µ), u)Λ(dt, du) + F
(
τ,Xτ
X
τ
)]
= Jµ (Θ) .
Therefore, λ : [0, T ]× [0, T ]×Rd → P(Γ) is such that Θ′(q ∈ V : qt = λ(t, t ∧ τ
Xˆ , Xˆτ
Xˆ
t )) = 1
for Lebesgue-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] and Jµ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ) = V µ.
Consider now a weak solution (Ω˜′′, F˜ ′′, (F˜ ′′t )t∈[0,T ],Q
′′,W ′′,X ′′) of
X ′′t = ξ +
∫ t
0
∫
Γ
b
(
s,X ′′s , L(s;µ),m(s;µ), u
)
λ
s,Y τ
X′′
t
(du)ds + σW ′′t , t ∈ [0, T ],
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where Y τ
X′′
t = (t∧τ
X′′ ,X ′′t ). Set Θ
′′ .= Q′′◦(X ′′,Λ′′)−1 where Λ′′(dt, du)
.
= dtλ
t,Y τ
X′′
t
(du). In
order not to make any confusion between specific solutions, here (Xˆ, Λˆ) denotes the canonical
process on X × V. First, Θ′ solves the martingale problem associated to
M̂
g
t (ϕ, q)
.
= g(ϕ(t)) − g(ϕ(0)) −
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s, ϕ(s), L(s;µ),m(s;µ), u)∇g(ϕ(s))1
[0,τ Xˆ )
(s)q(ds, du)
+
1
2
∫ t
0
d∑
i,j=1
(
σσT
)
i,j
∂2g(ϕ(s))
∂xi∂xj
1
[0,τ Xˆ)
(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
as well as the martingale problem associated to
M
g
t (ϕ, q)
.
= g(ϕ(t)) − g(ϕ(0)) −
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s, ϕ(s), L(s;µ),m(s;µ), u)∇g(ϕ(s))q(ds, du)
+
1
2
∫ t
0
d∑
i,j=1
(
σσT
)
i,j
∂2g(ϕ(s))
∂xi∂xj
ds,
up to time τ Xˆ ∧ T in the sense that the martingale property is satisfied for all s, t ∈ [0, T ],
0 ≤ s < t < τ Xˆ ∧ T . Second, Θ′′ solves the latter martingale problem up to time T . Then
Θ′ and Θ′′ solve the same martingale problem up to time τ Xˆ ∧ T . Moreover Θ′′(q ∈ V :
qt = λ(t, t ∧ τ
Xˆ , Xˆt)) = 1 for Lebesgue-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. If we set Θt
.
= Θ ◦ (Xˆ, Λˆ)−1·∧t for all
Θ ∈ P(X × V) and t ∈ [0, T ], then by uniqueness of the solution of the martingale problem
up to time τ Xˆ ∧ T
Θ′t(· ∩ {t ≤ τ
Xˆ ∧ T}) = Θ′′t (· ∩ {t ≤ τ
Xˆ ∧ T}).
Hence Jµ(Θ′) = Jµ(Θ′′). Now this Θ′′ satisfies item (iii) of Definition 3.3.
To conclude notice that the process Y τ
X′′
t = (t ∧ τ
X′′ ,X ′′t ) reduces to (t,X
′′
t ) before time
τX
′′
∧ T . Hence, also λ
t,Y τ
X′′
t
, with a slight abuse of notation, reduces to λt,X′′t . With
the additional assumption (C2), the second part of this lemma follows from the proof of
Proposition 3.6 applied to the stopped process Y τ
X
.
4 Approximate Nash equilibria for the N-player game
In this section, under conditions (H1)-(H8) with the additional assumptions (N1) and (N2)
(see below), we show that if we have a feedback solution of the MFG, then we can construct
a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding N -player game. The ap-
proximation is the content of Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1. In order to prove this result,
we interpret the N -player system as a system of N interacting diffusions. The study of
interacting particle systems goes back to McKean [47], Sznitman [54], Gärtner [25]. While
the usual mode of convergence of an N -particle system to its McKean-Vlasov limit is the
convergence in law of the empirical measures, in the present paper we obtain a stronger form
of propagation of chaos. Precisely, as in Lacker [39] but with possibly unbounded drift, we
prove that the empirical measures converge in a stronger topology, the τ -topology, which is
widely used in the large deviations literature (see, for instance, Chapter 6.2 in Dembo and
Zeitouni [18]); see Subsection 4.1.
In order to state the main results of this section, we need the following two additional assump-
tions, whose formulation requires some more terminology. We set dTVt (θ, θ˜)
.
= supB∈Ft |θ(B)−
θ˜(B)| for all θ, θ˜ ∈ P(X ). For t ∈ [0, T ), dt is only a pseudo-metric on P(X ). On the other
hand, for t = T it is a proper metric. In particular, dTVT is called total variation distance.
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Wherever possible without confusion, we will refer to dTVt as total variation distance for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
(N1) b : [0, T ] × X × P(X ) × Γ→ Rd is Lipschitz continuous in θ ∈ P(X ), uniformly in the
other variables in the total variation distance, i.e.:∣∣b (t, φ, θ, u)− b (t, φ, θ′, u)∣∣ ≤ LdTVt (θ, θ′)
for all (t, φ, u) ∈ [0, T ]× X × Γ.
(N2) The running cost can be decomposed as:
f(t, x, l,m, u) = f0(t, x, u) + f¯(t, x, l,m),
where its components fulfill
|f0(t, x, u)| ≤ K and
∣∣f¯(t, x, l,m)∣∣ ≤ C (1 + |x|+ |m|) ,
for all (t, x, l,m, u) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd× [0, 1]×Rd0×Γ. Moreover, both f0 : [0, T ]×R
d×Γ→
[0,∞) and f¯ : [0, T ]× Rd × [0, 1] × Rd0 → [0,∞) are jointly continuous.
Remark 4.1. Assumption (N1) can be obtained, for instance, by choosing w bounded, i.e.
‖w‖∞ <∞. This leads to L = C(1 + ‖w‖∞).
Theorem 4.1 (Approximate Nash equilibria - relaxed). Let N ∈ N, N > 1. Let (ν, λ, µ) be a
relaxed feedback MFG solution. Define λN ∈ U˜NN as λ
N .= (λN,i)i=1,...,N where λ
N,i(t, φN )
.
=
λ(t, φN,i) for all i = 1, . . . , N , t ∈ [0, T ] and φN ∈ XN .
Then under assumptions (H1)-(H8), (N1) and (N2), for every ǫ > 0 there exists a N ǫ ∈ N
such that λN is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game whenever N ≥ N ǫ, i.e. for
every i = 1, . . . , N and for any deviation β ∈ U˜N1 :
JN,i
(
λ
N
)
≤ JN,i
([
λN,−i, β
])
+ ǫ
for all N ≥ N ǫ.
Corollary 4.1 (Approximate Nash equilibria - strict). Let N > 1. Let (ν, u, µ) be a strict
feedback MFG solution. Define uN ∈ UNN as u
N .= (uN,i)i=1,...,N where u
N,i(t, φN )
.
= u(t, φN,i)
for all i = 1, . . . , N , t ∈ [0, T ] and φN ∈ XN .
Then under assumptions (H1)-(H8), (N1) and (N2), for every ǫ > 0 there exists a N ǫ ∈ N
such that uN is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game whenever N ≥ N ǫ, i.e. for
every i = 1, . . . , N and for any deviation v ∈ UN1 :
JN,i
(
u
N
)
≤ JN,i
([
uN,−i, v
])
+ ǫ
for all N ≥ N ǫ.
Before proceeding, we define the empirical measure ζN of the N -player system (Eq.(2.7)) as:
ζN (·)
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXN,i (·) , (4.1)
which is a P(X )-valued random variable. Moreover, we fix a relaxed feedback MFG solution
(ν, λ, µ) and define (cfr. Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1) λN ∈ U˜NN as λ
N .= (λN,i)i=1,...,N
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where λN,i(t, φN )
.
= λ(t, φN,i) for all i = 1, . . . , N , t ∈ [0, T ] and φN ∈ XN . In the next two
subsections we consider the following N -particle system:
X
N,1
t = X
N,1
0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b
(
s,XN,1, ζN , u
)
β
(
s,XN
)
(du)ds + σWN,1t
X
N,i
t = X
N,i
0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b
(
s,XN,i, µNs , u
)
λ
(
s,XN,i
)
(du)ds + σWN,it , (4.2)
for i = 2, . . . , N , t ∈ [0, T ] and where β ∈ U˜N1 is a generic single-player control. Precisely, in
Subsection 4.1 we set β(t, φN )
.
= λ(t, φN,1) for t ∈ [0, T ] and φN ∈ XN . In Subsection 4.2
instead, we let β be generic, which means that we allow the first player to deviate from the
MFG solution λ.
4.1 Propagation of chaos results
In this subsection we regard Eq.(4.2), with β(t, φN )
.
= λ(t, φN,1) for t ∈ [0, T ] and φN ∈ XN ,
as a system of N interacting symmetric diffusions. We associate to this system a McKean-
Vlasov equation and prove the particular instance of propagation of chaos needed to prove
Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1.
Definition 4.1 (McKean-Vlasov solution). A law θ∗ ∈ P(X ) is a McKean-Vlasov solution
of equation:
Xt = X0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b (s,X, θ∗, u)λ (s,X) (du)ds + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ], X0
d
∼ ν, (4.3)
if there exists a weak solution (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,t],P,X,W ) with P ◦X
−1 = θ∗ and P ◦X−10 = ν.
The following lemma ensures the well-posedness of Eq.(4.3).
Lemma 4.1 (Existence and uniqueness of McKean-Vlasov solutions). Grant assumptions
(H1)-(H8) and (N1)-(N2). Then existence and uniqueness holds for the McKean-Vlasov
solution of Eq.(4.3).
Proof. Let θ, θ′ ∈ Qν,|Γ|,C be two McKean-Vlasov solutions of Eq.(4.3). By Pinsker’s inequal-
ity there exists some constant CH > 0 such that d
TV
T (θ, θ
′) ≤ CH
√
H(θ|θ′) where H(θ|θ′) is
the relative entropy between θ and θ′. Hypothesis (N1) implies that:
H(θt|θ
′
t) = −E
θ
[
log
(
dθ′
dθ
∣∣∣
t
)]
≤
1
2
|σ−1|2L2
∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ
′)2ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
For α > 0, θ and θ′ ∈ Qν,|Γ|,C , let d
α(θ, θ′)2
.
=
∫ T
0 e
−αtdt(θ, θ
′)2dt. In addition, let Ψ :
P(X ) → P(X ) be the map that associates to each θ ∈ P(X ) the law of the solution of
Eq.(4.3) with θ in its drift. Assumption (N1) implies that
dα(Ψ(θ),Ψ(θ′))2 ≤
1
2
CH
α
|σ−1|2L2dα(θ, θ′)2.
Therefore, Ψ is a contraction for α large enough. The conclusion follows by Banach fixed
point theorem.
Now, we consider the sequence of empirical measures (ζN )N∈N in Eq.(4.1) associated to
the N -particle systems in Eq.(4.2). We follow Lacker [39] and we prove the convergence,
both in law and in probability in the τ -topology, of (ζN )N∈N to the McKean-Vlasov solution
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θ∗ ∈ P(X ) of Eq.(4.3). We remind that the τ -topology on X , denoted with τ(P(X )), is the
topology generated by the following sets:
Bf,x,δ
.
=
{
π ∈ P(X ) :
∣∣∣∣∫
X
f(y)π(dy)− x
∣∣∣∣ < δ} ,
where f : X → R is a measurable and bounded function, x ∈ R and δ is a strictly positive
constant. In particular, the τ -topology is the coarsest topology that makes the maps π 7→∫
X f(y)π(dy) continuous for all functions f : X → R measurable and bounded (see, for
instance, Chapter 6.2 in Dembo and Zeitouni [18]).
Moreover, we denote by w(P(X )) the weak topology on P(X ) and with B(P(X )) the
Borel σ-algebra on X generated by the open sets of the weak topology. The following lemma
adapts Theorem 2.5.1-2 in Lacker [39] to our working framework, in particular to the case of
diffusions with possibly unbounded drift.
Lemma 4.2 (Propagation of chaos). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (N1)-(N2). Let
θ∗ ∈ P(X ) be the unique McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq.(4.3). Then ζN
L
−→ θ∗ as N → ∞.
Moreover
lim
N→∞
PN
(
ζN 6∈ B
)
= 0
for all sets B which are (open) neighbourhoods of θ∗ in the τ -topology and are measurable
with respect to B(P(X )).
Proof. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space that supports an i.i.d. sequence of X -valued
random variables with law θ∗. For each N ∈ N set (FNt )t∈[0,T ] to be the filtration generated
by X1, . . . ,XN . Define:
W it
.
= σ−1
(
Xit − ξ −
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s,Xi, θ∗, u)λ(s,Xi)(du)ds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
In particular, W 1, . . . ,WN are independent Wiener processes on (Ω,F , (FNt )t∈[0,T ],P). Fix
N ∈ N, and consider the tuple (Ω,F , (FNt )t∈[0,T ],P, (X
N,1, . . . ,XN,N ), (W 1, . . . ,WN )), with
XN,i
.
= Xi, for all i = 1, . . . , N . This is a weak solution of:
XN,i = ξ +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s,XN,i, θ∗, u)λ(s,XN,i)(du)ds + σW it , t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Now, define PN as the probability measure under which:
X
N,i
t = ξ +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s,XN,i, ζN , u)λ(s,XN,i)(du)ds + σWN,it , t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
for some PN -Wiener process WN . In particular, dP
N
dP
.
= ZNT where, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ZNt
.
= Et
(∫ ·
0
N∑
i=1
∫
Γ
σ−1
(
b(s,XN,i, ζN , u)− b(s,XN,i, θ∗, u)
)
λ(s,XN,i)(du)dW is
)
.
Notice that (Ω,F , (FNt )t∈[0,T ],P
N ,XN ,WN ) is a weak solution of the N -particle system in
Eq.(4.2), with β(t, φN )
.
= λ(t, φN,1) for t ∈ [0, T ] and φN ∈ XN .
At this point, the rest of the proof can be performed as in Lacker [39], Theorem 2.5.1-2,
along the following steps:
30
(i) Ft1,t2 : P(X )→ R defined as:
Ft1,t2(θ)
.
=
∫
X
∫ t2
t1
∣∣∣∣∫
Γ
σ−1 (b(s, φ, θ, u)− b(s, φ, θ∗, u))λ(s, φ)(du)
∣∣∣∣2 dsθ∗(dφ)
is τ -continuous for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], t1 < t2 and B(P(X ))-measurable. Moreover
Ft1,t2(θ) ≤ L˜(t2 − t1)H(θ|θ
∗) for all t1, t2 ∈ [0, T ], t1 < t2 and for all θ ∈ P(X ).
(ii) XN,1,XN,2, . . . XN,N are i.i.d. under P, and therefore we can apply Sanov’s Theorem
(e.g. Theorem 6.2.10 in Dembo and Zeitouni [18]) to P ◦ (ζN )−1.
(iii) Derive a large deviation principle for PN ◦ (ζN )−1, precisely:
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
log PN
(
ζN 6∈ B
)
≤ −e−L˜T inf
θ 6∈B
H (θ|θ∗)
for all open neighbourhoods B of θ in the τ -topology that are B(P(X )), L˜ > 0. Con-
clude by showing that infθ 6∈BH(θ|θ
∗) ≥ 0.
4.2 Approximate Nash equilibria
This section is devoted to the proof of one of the main results of the present paper, namely
the construction of approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player game from a solution of
the limit problem, whose existence has been proved in Section 3. In particular, results of
previous Subsection (4.1) enable us to perform the passage to the many player limit even if
feedback MFG strategies are in general only progressively measurable functionals, possibly
discontinuous in the state variable. Indeed, as we have observed in the introduction, in Campi
and Fischer [7] the proof of the existence of approximated Nash equilibria for the N -player
games was crucially based on the continuity of the MFG solution with respect to the state
variable. In our setting, such a regularity property is no longer feasible due to the possibly
unboundedness of the coefficients. Therefore, in order to circumvent this difficulty, we will
make use of the strong form of propagation of chaos in Lemma 4.2, which allows to pass to
the limit even without any continuity property for the MFG solution, at the price of stronger
continuity for the drift.
We start with some preliminary estimates ensuring that the costs remain bounded in the
mean-field limit despite the sub-linear growth.
Lemma 4.3 (A-priori estimates). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8). Consider the dynamics in
Eq.(4.2). Then for any α ≥ 1,
sup
N∈N
EP
N [
‖XN,i‖α∞
]
≤ K(α)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and where K(α) <∞ is a positive constant independent of N .
Proof. We show how to prove the a-priori estimates for α = 1 both in case the first player
chooses the MFG control λ and in the case of a generic deviation β. For α > 1 similar
estimates to those in Lemma 3.2 apply here as well. First set λN,1(t, φN )
.
= λ(t, φN,1) for
(t, φN ) ∈ [0, T ] × XN . Then by symmetry and Grönwall’s lemma:
EP
N [
‖XN,1‖∞,t
]
≤ C(t) + C (1 + C)
∫ t
0
EP
N [
‖XN,1‖∞,s
]
ds
≤ C(t)eC(1+C)t, t ∈ [0, T ]
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where C(t)
.
= E|ξ|+ T (|Γ|+ 2C + C2) + |σ|EP
N
[‖WN,1‖∞,t] and ξ
d
∼ ν.
Now set λN,1(t, φN )
.
= β(t, φN ) for (t, φN ) ∈ [0, T ] × XN and for a generic β ∈ U˜N1 . In
this case, we lose the symmetry among the players and so we have to deal with a system of
inequalities:E
PN
[
‖XN,1‖∞,t
]
≤ C(t) +C
∫ t
0
((
1 + CN
)
EP
N [
‖XN,1‖∞,s
]
+C N−1N E
PN
[
‖XN,2‖∞,s
])
ds,
EP
N [
‖XN,2‖∞,t
]
≤ C(t) +C
∫ t
0
(
C
NE
PN
[
‖XN,1‖∞,s
]
+
(
1 + CN−1N
)
EP
N [
‖XN,2‖∞,s
])
ds.
The conclusion now follows by applying Grönwall’s lemma to both inequalities, inserting the
second inequality into the first one and then applying Grönwall’s lemma again.
We now prove the tightness of the sequence of laws (PN ◦ (ζN )−1)N∈N. Then, thanks to
Lemma 4.2, we characterize the limit points of (PN ◦(ζN )−1)N∈N as McKean-Vlasov solutions
of Eq.(4.3); see Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.4 (Tightness). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (N1)-(N2). Then the sequence
(PN ◦ (ζN )−1)N∈N is tight in P(P(X )).
Proof. The tightness of such a sequence is a consequence of Sznitman [54], Proposition 2.2,
and of the Kolmogorov-Chentsov criterion (see, for instance, Corollary 14.9 in Kallenberg
[35]).
Lemma 4.5 (Characterization of limit points). Grant assumptions (H1)-(H8) and (N1)-
(N2). Let (Pn ◦ (ζn)−1)n∈N be a convergent subsequence of (P
N ◦ (ζN )−1)N∈N. Let ζ be a
random variable defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) with values in P(X ) such that
ζn
L
−→ ζ. Then
(i) ζ coincides P-a.s. with the unique McKean-Vlasov solution θ∗ of Eq.(4.3).
(ii) The sequence (ζN )N∈N converges in probability in the τ -topology (hence also in law) to
θ∗.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 there exists a convergent subsequence (Pn◦(ζn)−1)n∈N ⊂ P(P(X )) and
a limit P ◦ ζ−1 ∈ P(P(X )) such that ζn
L
−→ ζ. Lemma 4.2 guarantees the convergence in law
of the entire sequence to the deterministic limit θ∗ ∈ Qν,|Γ|,C , which is the unique McKean-
Vlasov solution of Eq.(4.3). By uniqueness in law of the weak limit we have P ◦ ζ−1 = δθ∗ .
This means ζ = θ∗ P-a.s.. Lemma 4.2 also gives convergence in probability in the τ -topology
of (ζN )N∈N to θ
∗.
Corollary 4.2 (Characterization of the convergence). Under the assumptions of Lemma 4.5:
(i) For all f : X → R Borel-measurable and bounded and such that θ 7→
∫
X f(φ)θ(dφ) is
τ(P(X ))-continuous and B(P(X ))-measurable:
EP
N
[∫
X
f(φ)ζN (dφ)
]
−→
N→∞
EP
[∫
X
f(φ)ζ(dφ)
]
.
(ii) PN ◦ (XN,1, ζN )−1
w
⇀ θ∗ ⊗ δθ∗ . Moreover P
N ◦ (XN,1)−1
w
⇀ θ∗ and PN ◦ (ζN )−1
w
⇀ δθ∗.
Proof. (i) This is a consequence of Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.5 and of the almost sure equality
ζ = θ∗.
(ii) We already know that PN ◦ (ζN )−1
w
⇀ δθ∗ from Lemma 4.5. Convergence of P
N ◦
(XN,1)−1 to θ∗ then follows from Sznitman [54], Proposition 2.2, and the symmetry of the
system in Eq.(2.7).
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Remark 4.2. Let D
.
= {φ ∈ X : τ(φ) is discontinuous at φ}. Since ζ
a.s.
= θ∗ ∈ Qν,|Γ|,C , by
Lemma A.4 θ∗(D) = 0 and the statement of Corollary 4.2 holds for f = 1D as well.
Finally, we conclude this section with the proof of Theorem 4.1 and of Corollary 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We prove Theorem 4.1 through the following steps:
(j) limN→∞ J
N,1(λN ) = Jµ(λ).
(jj) Let βN,1 ∈ UN1 be such that
JN,1([λN,−1, βN,1]) ≤ inf
β∈UN1
JN,1([λN,−1, β]) +
ǫ
2
.
Then
lim inf
N→∞
JN,1
([
λ
N,−1, βN,1
])
≥ Jµ(λ).
(jjj) JN,1(λN ) ≤ infβ∈UN1
JN,1([λN,−1, β]) + ǫ.
We consider the dynamics in Eq.(4.2). In (j) we set λN,1(t, φN ) = λ(t, φN,i) for all (t, φ) ∈
[0, T ]×X and prove convergence of the first-player cost functional to the cost functional of the
MFG. In (jj) instead we allow the first player to deviate and choose λN,1(t, φN ) = βN,1(t, φN )
for all (t, φ) ∈ [0, T ]×X where βN,1 ∈ U˜N1 generic single-player relaxed control. We conclude
the proof in (jjj) by combining the results in (j) and (jj).
Proof of (j). To prove that JN,1(λN ) → Jµ(λ) as N → ∞ we split each cost functional
in the sum of two terms:
JN,1(λN ) = EP
N
[∫
[0,T ]×Γ
∫
X
1[0,τ(φ))(t)f0(t, φ, u)λ(t, φ)(du)ζ
N (dφ)dt
]
+EP
N
[∫ T
0
1[0,τN,1)(t)f¯(t,X
N,1, ζN )dt+ F (τN,1,XN,1
τN,1
)
]
and
Jµ(λ) = EP
[∫
[0,T ]×Γ
∫
X
1[0,τ(φ))(t)f0(t, φ, u)λ(t, φ)(du)ζ(dφ)dt
]
+EP
[∫ T
0
1[0,τ)(t)f¯(t,X, ζ)dt + F (τ,Xτ )
]
.
Convergence of the first terms is a consequence of Corollary 4.2 and of the boundedness of
f0. Convergence of the second terms is again a consequence of Corollary 4.2, of Lemma 4.5,
sub-linearity of f¯ and F , the fact that θ∗ ∈ Qν,|Γ|,C together with Lemma A.5.
Proof of (jj). We follow the proof of Theorem 3.10 in Lacker [40] with suitable modifica-
tions due to the possibly unbounded drift and history-dependence induced by the presence
of the first exit time from O.
Let (ΩN ,FN , (FNt )t∈[0,T ],Q
N , Y N ,WN )N∈N be a weak solutions of the N -player system in
Eq.(4.2). Let (ζN )N∈N be the associated empirical measures. Under Q
N the first player’s
dynamics is:
Y
N,1
t = Y
N,1
0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s, Y N,1, ζNY , u)β
N,1(s,YN )(du)ds + σWN,1t , t ∈ [0, T ].
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Now let PN the probability measure under which the first player’s dynamics is instead:
Y
N,1
t = Y
N,1
0 +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s, Y N,1, ζNY , u)λ(s, Y
N,1)(du)ds + σW˜N,1t , t ∈ [0, T ].
Precisely dQ
N
dPN
= ZNT where, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ZNt = Et
(∫ ·
0
∫
Γ
b(s, Y N,1, ζNY , u)(β
N,1(s,YN )− λ(s, Y N,1))(du)dW˜s
)
.
Corollary A.1 gives the uniform integrability of the sequence of exponential martingales
(ZN )N∈N. Therefore convergence of the empirical measures to θ
∗ in probability in the τ -
topology under PN implies convergence of the empirical measures to the same limit in prob-
ability in the τ -topology under QN . Hence ζNY
L
−→ θ∗ under QN and:
lim
N→∞
QN
(
ζNY 6∈ B
)
= 0
for all sets B which are neighbourhoods of θ in the τ -topology and belong to B(P(X )).
The tightness of (Y N,1)N∈N under Q
N still follows from their tightness under PN . Con-
sider (βN,1(t,YN ))t∈[0,T ] as a single-player relaxed stochastic open-loop control and denote
it simply by (βN,1t )t∈[0,T ]. Regard (Y
N,1, βN,1, ζNY )N∈N as a sequence of random variables
with values in X × V × P(X ). Compactness of V and tightness of (Y N,1, ζNY )N∈N imply the
tightness of (Y N,1, βN,1, ζNY )N∈N under Q
N .
Let (Y, β, θ∗) be a limit point defined on some probability space with probability measure
Q. Then by a standard martingale argument it can be shown to satisfy:
Yt = ξ +
∫
[0,t]×Γ
b(s, Y, θ∗, d)βt(du)ds + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.4)
where W is a Q-Wiener process. As in (j) we split JN,1([λN,−1, βN,1]) in two terms:
JN,1([λN,−1, βN,1]) = EQ
N
[∫
[0,T ]×Γ
1[0,τN,1)(t)f0(t, Y
N,1, u)βN,1t (du)dt
]
+EQ
N
[∫ T
0
1[0,τN,1)(t)f¯(t, Y
N,1, ζNY )dt+ F (τ
N,1, Y
N,1
τN,1
)
]
.
We move along a weakly converging subsequence of (Y N,1, βN,1,WN,1)N∈N under Q
N to the
limit point (Y, β,W ) in Eq.(4.4). Convergence of the first and second summands above now
works as in the proof of (j). Considering again the whole sequence, we obtain
lim inf
N→∞
JN,1([λN,−1, βN,1]) ≥ inf
β
EQ
N
[∫
[0,T ]×Γ
1[0,τ)(t)f(t, Y, θ
∗, u)βt(du)dt+ F (τ, Yτ )
]
= V µ
where the last infimum is taken over all relaxed stochastic open-loop controls and the last
equality follows from the embedding of the set of strict controls into the set of relaxed controls
and from the chattering lemma (El Karoui et al. [20], Fleming and Rishel [22], Bahlali et al.
[3]).
Proof of (jjj). This is a consequence of steps (j) and (jj). Indeed
JN,1(λN )− inf
β∈UN1
JN,1([λN,−1, β]) ≤ JN,1(λN )− Jµ(λ) + Jµ(λ)− JN,1([λN,−1, βN,1]) +
ǫ
2
.
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Now by steps (j) and (jj) there exists N ǫ ∈ N such that for all N ≥ N ǫ
JN,1(λN )− Jµ(λ) ≤
ǫ
4
and Jµ(λ)− JN,1([λN,−1, βN,1]) ≤
ǫ
4
.
Hence we conclude that JN,1(λN ) ≤ infβ∈UN1 J
N,1([λN,−1, β]) + ǫ for all N ≥ N ǫ, which
establishes the statement of Theorem 4.1.
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A Appendix
This appendix provides some of the technical results used in the paper. More in detail,
we state existence and uniqueness of weak solutions of SDEs with sub-linear drift. We
characterize the space of laws of processes with sub-linear drift, i.e. the space of probability
measures θ ∈ Qν,K,C ⊂ P(X ). Also, we collect some regularity results on the exit time τ
X
with respect to measures in Qν,K,C . Finally, we discuss the weak convergence of measures and
convergence in the 1-Wasserstein distance for (test) functions f having few discontinuities
and a sub-linear growth.
Throughout this section, we will use the following notation. By (Et(M))t∈[0,T ] we will
indicate the stochastic exponential of a continuous local martingale M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ]. More-
over, given a function f : E → R, E Polish, we denote by Df the set of its discontinuity points.
A.1 Existence and uniqueness of solution of SDEs with sub-linear drift
We start with a slight variation of the well-known Beneš’ condition [4]. More precisely, we
allow the drift to depend on a rescaled Wiener process with a random independent initial
condition ξ
d
∼ ν.
Lemma A.1 (Beneš’ condition). Let b : [0, T ] × X → Rd be a progressively measurable
functional such that:
|b (t, φ)| ≤ C (1 + ‖φ‖∞) , (t, φ) ∈ [0, T ] × X .
Let σ ∈ Rd×d be a positive definite matrix with full rank. Set bt
.
= σ−1b(t,X) for t ∈ [0, T ]
where:
Xt = ξ + σWt, ξ
d
∼ ν, t ∈ [0, T ]
on some filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) with Wiener process W independent of
ξ. Then:
Zt
.
= Et
(∫ ·
0
bsdWs
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]
is a martingale.
Proof. We follow the proof of Corollary 3.5.16 in Karatzas and Shreve [36]. Precisely let
t0 = 0 < t1 < . . . < tn−1 < tn = T be a partition of the interval [0, T ]. Then thanks to the
sub-linearity of the drift∫ tn
tn−1
|bs|
2 ds ≤ (tn − tn−1)C
2 (1 + ‖X‖∞)
2 .
Let Y n
.
= (Y nt )t∈[0,T ] be the process defined by:
Y nt
.
= e
1
4
(tn−tn−1)C2(1+|Xt|)2 .
Notice that Y n is a sub-martingale and that by Doob’s maximal inequality (see, for instance,
Theorem 1.3.8.iv in [36]) we have E[‖Y n‖2∞] ≤ 4E[(Y
n
T )
2]. Moreover:
E
[
(Y nT )
2
]
≤ E
[
e
1
2
(tn−tn−1)C2(1+2|ξ|2+2|σ|2|WT |
2)
]
= E
[
e(tn−tn−1)C
2|σ|2|WT |
2
]
E
[
e
1
2
(tn−tn−1)C2(1+2|ξ|2)
]
,
where in the second equality we use the independence between ξ and W . To conclude, it
is sufficient to choose (tk − tk−1), k = 1, . . . , n, sufficiently small, for instance (tk − tk−1) <
min{ 1
2C2|σ|2
, λ
C2
}, and to apply Corollary 3.5.14 in [36].
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Second, we give conditions on the moments of the stochastic exponential (Liptser and Shiryaev
[46]).
Corollary A.1. Under the assumptions of Lemma A.1, the process Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] has finite
moments of any order p ∈ [1,∞), i.e. E
[
Z
p
T
]
<∞ for all p ∈ [1,∞).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma A.1 combined with Corollary 2 in Grigelionis
and Mackevičius [28].
Lemma A.2 (Existence and uniqueness of weak solutions). Let b : [0, T ] × X → Rd be a
progressively measurable functional such that:
|b (t, φ)| ≤ C (1 + ‖φ‖∞) , (t, φ) ∈ [0, T ] × X .
Let σ ∈ Rd×d a positive definite matrix with full rank. Then there exists a weak solution
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P,X,W ) of:
Xt = ξ +
∫ t
0
b(s,X)ds + σdWt, ξ
d
∼ ν, t ∈ [0, T ].
Additionally, this solution is unique in law.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma A.1 and from Girsanov’s theorem (see Propo-
sitions 5.3.6 and 5.3.10 in Karatzas and Shreve [36]).
A.2 Characterization of the set Qν,K,C
Lemma A.3 (Laws of processes with sub-linear drift). Let θ ∈ Qν,K,C ⊂ P(X ). Then
θ ∼ Wν , i.e. θ is equivalent to the Wiener measure Wν .
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma A.1, Girsanov’s theorem and Bayes’ rule to
ensure that Z−1 given by Lemma A.1 is still a martingale.
Before proceeding further, we recall that τX is the first exit time from O in the path space:
τX(ϕ) = τ(ϕ)
.
= inf {t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) 6∈ O} , ϕ ∈ X ,
where O ⊂ Rd satisfies Assumption (H4).
Lemma A.4 (Regularity results). Let θ ∈ Qν,K,C. Let O ⊂ R
d satisfy Assumption (H4) and
let X be the identity process on X . Then
(a) τX <∞ θ-almost surely.
(b) The mapping ϕ 7→ τX(ϕ), from X to [0,∞], is θ-a.s. continuous.
(c) θ(τX = t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(d) The mapping ϕ 7→ 1[0,τX(ϕ))(t), from X to R, is θ-a.s. continuous for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(e) Properties (a)-(d) hold for O = (0,∞)×d as well.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma D.3 in Campi and Fischer [7]. Notice that
by Lemma A.3 each θ ∈ Qν,K,C is equivalent to W
ν . So, it is sufficient to check properties
(a)-(d) for Wν .
(a) This is a consequence of the law of iterated logarithms (as time tends to infinity) and
the fact that O is strictly included in Rd.
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(b) This, again, is a consequence of the law of iterated logarithms (as time tends to zero),
the smoothness of the boundary of O, the non-degeneracy of σ and the fact that O is strictly
included in Rd (Kushner and Dupuis [37], pp. 260-261).
(c) This is a consequence of the following relations:
Wν(τ = t) ≤ Wν(Xt ∈ ∂O) = 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where in the last equality we use the fact that the Lebesgue measure of the boundary of a
convex subset of Rd is identically equal to zero (Lang [41]), and that Wν ◦X−1t is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(d) This is a consequence of properties (b) and (c) above.
(e) When O = (0,∞)×d it turns out that:
τ(φ) = min
i=1,...,d
τ i(φ), φ ∈ X
where τ i(φ)
.
= inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : φi(t) ≤ 0} for i = 1, . . . , d and φ ∈ X . Then the conclusion
follows from the continuity result in dimension d = 1 (Kushner and Dupuis [37], pp. 260-261)
applied to each τ i.
A.3 Additional convergence results
Lemma A.5 (Convergence in the 1-Wasserstein distance). Let E be a Polish space with a
complete metric dE . Let µ, (µ
n)n∈N ⊂ P1(E) such that W1(µ
n, µ) → 0 as n → ∞. Let
f : E → R be a function such that |f(x)| ≤ C(1 + dE(x, x0)) for all x ∈ E, for some x0 ∈ E
and for some constant C > 0. Besides, assume µ(Df ) = 0. Then:∫
E
f(x)µn(dx) −→
n→∞
∫
E
f(x)µ(dx).
Proof. The proof works as in Villani [55], proof of Theorem 7.12.iv, the only difference being
that here f can have discontinuities such that µ(Df ) = 0. In particular we perform the same
decomposition as in [55], i.e. f(x) = f
(1)
R (x) + f
(2)
R (x) with f
(1)
R (x)
.
= f(x) ∧ (C(1 +R)) and
f
(2)
R (x)
.
= f(x) − f
(1)
R (x) for all x ∈ E and for some R > 0. |f
(1)
R | is bounded by C(1 + R)
and µ(D
f
(1)
R
) = 0 since D
f
(1)
R
⊂ Df . Then all limits can be performed just as in [55], proof of
Theorem 7.12.iv.
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